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Abstract
In this paper, a short survey about the concepts underlying general logics is
given. In particular, a novel rigorous definition of a fuzzy negation as an
operation acting on a lattice to render it into a fuzzy logic is presented. Ac-
cording to this definition, a fuzzy negation satisfies the weak double negation
condition, requiring double negation to be expansive, the antitony condition,
being equivalent to the disjunctive De Morgan law and thus warranting com-
patibility of negation with the lattice operations, and the Boolean boundary
condition stating that the universal bounds of the lattice are the negation of
each other. From this perspective, the most general logics are fuzzy logics,
containing as special cases paraconsistent (quantum) logics, quantum logics,
intuitionistic logics, and Boolean logics, each of which given by its own al-
gebraic restrictions. New examples of a non-contradictory logic violating the
conjunctive De Morgan law, and of a typical non-orthomodular fuzzy logic
along with its explicit lattice representation are given.
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1 Introduction
Logic is as empirical as geometry. We live in a world with a non-
classical logic.
Hilary Putnam
Logic is the science which investigates the principles governing correct or reliable
inference. It deals with propositions and their relations to each other. Besides the
classical Boolean logic there has been established various generalizations such as
modal, intuitionistic, quantum, or fuzzy logic, as well as propositional structures
underlying substructural logics which focus on relaxations of structural rules gov-
erning validity and provability. The purpose of the present article is to give a brief
unifying survey of the algebraic interrelations of logics which does not seem to
have been presented before in this comprehensive form. It does not intend to deal,
however, with the wide aspect of semantic algebras deriving logics, an important
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issue in considerations both of fuzzy logics and of quantum logics. It concentrates
on the propositional structure of general logics but noteworthy not on logical cal-
culi neither on provability or model theory. Although this work has been greatly
influenced by some classical references such as [5, 32], it provides a wider spec-
trum by including fuzzy logics, and thus complements modern approaches like
[38] in revealing the algebraic hierarchy of logics as propositional structures of
substructural logics, especially pointing out the decisive role of negation.
The mathematical concept underlying any logic is the notion of the lattice, a
partially ordered set with two binary operations forming an algebraic structure. Es-
tablishing a lattice with an additional fuzzy negation operator yields a fuzzy logic,
and further algebraic requirements such as non-contradiction, paraconsistency, or-
thomodularity, or distributivity then specify it to the different classical and non-
classical logics as sketched in Figure 5. This comprehensive view on the different
concepts of logics is enabled by defining a fuzzy negation as a lattice operation
satisfying weak double negation, antitony and the Boolean boundary condition.
Remarkably, antitony is equivalent to the disjunctive De Morgan law, but does
not imply the conjunctive De Morgan law. This definition is well established in
fuzzy logic contexts [16] and generalizes commonly used notions of a negation as
an involutive operation [14, 17]. It is wide enough to include all common fuzzy,
quantum, intuitionistic, and classical logics.
Consequently, the next section of is paper starts with an outline of lattice theory
and subsequently gives the definition and important properties of a fuzzy logic and
its common sublogics. In the following sections, various logics are considered in
some more detail, with emphasis on examples of a typical non-orthomodular fuzzy
logic and some special logics of quantum registers in unentangled states.
1.1 Notation
Every investigation, including the present one about logic, has to be communicated
by means of language. The language being used is usually called the metalan-
guage. It has to be distinguished carefully from the language of the studied logic,
the object language There are many different notations existing in the literature, so
Table 1 lists the symbols as they are used in the present text.
2 Lattices
Lattice theory is concerned with the properties of a binary relation ≦, to be read
“precedes or equals,” “is contained in,” “is a part of,” or “is less than or equal to.”
This relation is assumed to have certain properties, the most basic of which leads
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A ⇒ B if A then B; A only if B
A ⇔ B A if and only if B
Metalanguage x := y x is defined as y
x = y x equals y
x≦ y x precedes y, x is less than or equal to y
¬x not x (negation)
x∧ y x and y (meet, conjunction)
Object language x∨ y x or y (union, disjunction)
x→ y x implies y, ¬x∨ y (material implication)
x↔ y x is equivalent to y, (x→ y)∧ (y→ x) (equivalence operation)
Table 1: Logical functors of metalanguage and an exemplary object language, here Boolean logic.
to the following concept of a “partially ordered set,” or “poset.”
Definition 1. A poset (X ,≦) is a set X in which a binary relation x≦ y is defined,
which satisfies, for all x, y, z ∈ X ,
(Reflexivity) x≦ x (1)
(Antisymmetry) If x≦ y and y≦ x, then x = y. (2)
(Transitivity) If x≦ y and y≦ z, then x≦ z. (3)
♦
If x ≦ y and x 6= y, we write x < y, and say that x “precedes,” “properly con-
tains,” or “is less than” y. The relation x ≦ y is also written y ≧ x, and reads “y
succeeds or contains x.” We often write simply X instead of (X ,≦) and speak of
the poset X . Some familiar examples of partially ordered sets are the following.
Examples 2. (a) (R,≦) is a poset, where ≦ denotes “less than or equal.”
(b) Let P(Ω) be the potential set of a set Ω, i.e., the set of all subsets of Ω
including Ω itself and the empty set /0. Then (P(Ω),⊆) is a poset.
(c) (N, |) is a poset. Here N is the set of positive integers, and x | y denotes “x
divides y.”
(d) Let F([a,b]) be the set of all real-valued functions f (x) on the interval [a.b]
(where a < b), and let f ≦ g mean that f (x) ≦ g(x) for every x ∈ [a,b]. Then
(F([a,b]),≦) is a poset.
(e) Let n > 1. Then (Rn,) is a poset, where x  y denotes “componentwise
less than or equal,” i.e., x j ≦ y j for all j = 1, . . . , n where x = (x1, . . . , xn) and
y = (y1, . . . , yn). Note that there exist many points x, y ∈Rn such that neither x y
nor y x holds, for instance for x = (1,2) and y = (0,3). ♦
A common way to depict a poset with finitely many elements is by means of
a Hasse diagram, cf. Fig. 1. Here each element of the poset is represented by a
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M5 N5 O6 L7 23 P6
Figure 1: Hasse diagrams of various posets. All depicted posets unless P6 are lattices.
circle, placing y higher than x whenever x < y. If x < y and there exists no z ∈ X
such that x < z < y, then a straight line is drawn between x and y. (In this case, one
often says “y covers x”).
A poset X can contain at most one element O ∈ X which satisfies O≦ x for all
x ∈ X . For if O and ˜O are two such elements, then O ≦ ˜O and also ˜O ≦ O, i.e.,
O = ˜O by (2). If such an element O exists, it is called the least element of X . With
the analogous reasoning, the greatest element of X , if it exists, is denoted by I and
satisfies x ≦ I for all x ∈ X . If both O and I ∈ X exist, they are called universal
bounds of X , since then O ≦ x≦ I for all x ∈ X . Such an element O is also called
the zero of the poset L, and I the unit of the poset. In connection with logics, being
special posets as we shall see below, O is also called the “absurdity.”
In a poset X with a least element O ∈ X , elements x ∈ X satisfying O < x such
that there is no y ∈ X with O < y < x are called atoms or points of X . In logics we
thus can state that “atoms immediately follow from absurdity.”
An upper bound of a subset Y ⊆ X of a poset X is an element a ∈ X with y≦ a
for every y ∈Y . The least upper bound supY is an upper bound contained in every
other upper bound. By (2), supY is unique if it exists. Note that Y = P6 \ {I} in
Figure 1 does not contain an upper bound. The notions of lower bound and greatest
lower bound infY are defined analogously. Again by (2), infY is unique if it exists.
Definition 3. A lattice is a poset L such that any elements x, y ∈ L have a unique
greatest lower bound, denoted x∧ y, and a unique least upper bound x∨ y, i.e.,
x∧ y = inf{x,y}, x∨ y = sup{x,y}. (4)
The operation ∧ is also called meet, and the operation ∨ is called join. A lattice
L is complete, when for any set D ⊆ L the bounds supD and infD exist; it is σ -
complete, when for any countable set D ⊆ L the bounds supD and infD exist. A
lattice is atomic if every element is a join of atoms. ♦
The lattice condition will later ensure that the logical operations of conjunction
(∧) and disjunction (∨) are well-defined for any pairs of propositions. For instance,
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the two atoms of the poset P6 in Figure 1 do not have unique least upper bounds,
hence P6 is not a lattice. Moreover, it follows that finite sets of pairwise disjoint
(“orthogonal”) propositions also have a well-defined disjunction. The complete-
ness condition ensures that the latter is true also for countable sets of pairwise
disjoint propositions. This is arguably not an essential requirement for a logic
(must logic be infinitary?), but it allows for probability measures to be defined on
an infinite lattice or poset, since it is customary to require that the probability of a
countable set of disjoint events be well-defined and equal to the countable sum of
the probabilities of the disjoint events (σ -additivity of probabilities).
Example 4. The poset (P(Ω),⊆) in Example 2(b) is a lattice, where for any
family A = {A1, A2, . . . } of subsets A1, A2, . . .⊆ Ω we have
infA =
⋂
j
A j, supA =
⋃
j
A j. (5)
Note that A ⊆ P(Ω). Especially, we have A∧B = A∩B and A∨B = A∪B for
two subsets A, B ⊆ Ω. Especially, P(Ω) is a complete lattice. ♦
Example 5. For a field K, let L(Kn) = {V ⊆ Kn: V is a vector space} be the set
of all subspaces of the vector space Kn. Moreover, for any set A ⊆ Kn let span A
denote the intersection of all subspaces of Kn which contain A, i.e.,
span A = ∩{V ⊆ L(Kn) : A⊆V}. (6)
span A is also called the “linear hull” of A. Then with ≦ defined as the usual set
inclusion and with the following definitions for two subspaces V , W ⊆ Kn,
V ∧W =V ∩W, V ∨W = span(V ∪W), (7)
the set L(Kn) is a lattice. It has universal bounds O = {0} and I =Kn. ♦
Lemma 6. Let L be a lattice L, and x, y ∈ L with x≦ y. Then for all z ∈ L,
x∧ z≦ y∧ z. (8)
Proof. We have x∧ z≦ z and x∧ z≦ x≦ y by (4), hence (8) by (4) again.
The binary operations ∧ and ∨ in lattices have important algebraic properties,
some of them analogous to those of ordinary multiplication and addition.
Andreas de Vries: Algebraic hierarchy of logics 7
Theorem 7. In a lattice L, the operations of meet and join satisfy the following
laws, whenever the expressions referred to exist.
(Idempotent laws) x∧ x = x, x∨ x = x. (9)
(Commutative laws) x∧ y = y∧ x, x∨ y = y∨ x. (10)
(Associative laws) x∧ (y∧ z) = (x∧ y)∧ z, x∨ (y∨ z) = (x∨ y)∨ z.(11)
(Laws of absorption) x∧ (x∨ y) = x∨ (x∧ y) = x. (12)
(The laws of absorption are often also called “laws of contraction.”) Moreover,
(Consistency) x≦ y ⇐⇒ x∧ y = x ⇐⇒ x∨ y = y. (13)
Proof. The idempotence and the commutativity laws are evident from (4). The
associativity laws (11) follow since x∧ (y∧ z) and (x∧ y)∧ z are both equal to
sup{x,y,z} whenever all expressions referred to exist. The equivalence between
x≦ y, x∧y = x, and x∨y = y is easily verified. Thus x≧ y is equivalent to x∧y = y
and x∨ y = x, and this implies (12).
It can be proved that the identities (9) – (12) completely charactarize lattices
[5, Theorem I.8]. In fact Dedekind, who first considered the concept of a lattice
(“Dualgruppe”) at the end of the 19th century, used (9) – (12) to define lattices.
Theorem 8 (Principle of Duality). Given any valid formula over a lattice, the dual
formula obtained by interchanging ≦ with ≧, and simultaneously ∧ with ∨, is also
valid.
Proof. Since for any elements x, y of the lattice we have x≦ y if and only if y≧ x,
the poset structure with respect to ≧ is isomorphic to the poset structure ≦, but
with ∧ and ∨ interchanged.
The dual of a lattice is simply its Hasse diagram (Fig. 1) turned upside down,
illustrating the principle of duality. In fact, the two poset structures ≦ and ≧ of
a lattice are tied up to each other by the laws of associativity, absorption, and
consistency so strongly that they are inescapably dual. The following theorem
concerns relations of modality and distributivity which are valid in every lattice.
Theorem 9. Let L be a lattice. For all x, y, z ∈ L we then have the “modular
inequality”
x∨ (y∧ z)≦ (x∨ y)∧ z if x≦ z, (14)
and the “distributive inequalities”
x∧ (y∨ z) ≧ (x∧ y)∨ (x∧ z) (15)
x∨ (y∧ z) ≦ (x∨ y)∧ (x∨ z) (16)
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Proof. If x ≦ z, we have with x ≦ x∨ y that x ≦ (x∨ y)∧ z. Also y∧ z≦ y ≦ x∨ y
and y∨ z ≦ z. Therefore, y∧ z ≦ (x∨ y)∧ z, i.e. x∨ (y∧ z) ≦ (x∨ y)∧ z, which is
(14).
Clearly x∧y≦ x, and x∧y≦ y≦ y∨ z; hence x∧y≦ x∧ (y∨ z). Also x∧ z≦ x,
x∧ z ≦ z≦ y∨ z; hence x∧ z≦ x∧ (y∨ z). That is, x∧ (y∨ z) is an upper bound of
x∧ y and x∧ z, from which (15) follows. The inequality (16) follows from (15) by
the principle of duality.
2.1 Distributive lattices
In many lattices, and thus in many logics, the analogy between the lattice opera-
tions ∧, ∨ and the arithmetic operations ·, + includes the distributive law x(y+ z)
= xy+ xz. In such lattices, the distributive inequalities (15) and (16) can be sharp-
ened to identities. These identities do not hold in all lattices; for instance, they
fail in the lattices M5 and N5 in Figure 2. We now study distributivity, which in a
lattice is symmetric with respect to ∧ and ∨ due to the duality principle (Theorem
8), which is not the case in ordinary algebra, where a+(bc) 6= (a+b)(a+ c) due
to the priority precedence of multiplication (·) and addition (+).
I
x y z
O
I
y
x
z
O
I
y
z
x
O
M5 N5 N5
Figure 2: Non-distributive lattices.
Definition 10. A lattice L is called distributive if the following identity holds.
x∧ (y∨ z) = (x∧ y)∨ (x∧ z) for all x,y,z ∈ L. (17)
♦
Theorem 11. In any lattice L, the identity (17) is equivalent to
x∨ (y∧ z) = (x∨ y)∧ (x∨ z) for all x,y,z ∈ L. (18)
Proof. We prove (17) ⇒ (18). The converse (18) ⇒ (17) follows analogously.
(x∨ y)∧ (x∨ z) = [(x∨ y)∧ x]∨ [(x∨ y)∧ z] by (17)
= x∨ [z∧ (x∨ y)] by (12), (10)
= x∨ [(z∧ x)∨ (z∧ y)] by (17)
= [x∨ [z∧ x)]∨ (z∧ y) by (11)
= x∨ (z∧ y) by (12)
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However, in nondistributive lattices the truth of (17) for some elements x, y, z
does not imply them obeying (18), as the two variants of N5 in Figure 2 show. An
important property of distributive lattices is the following.
Theorem 12. A lattice L is distributive if and only if the following property is
satisfied for all a, x, y ∈ L:
a∧ x = a∧ y and a∨ x = a∨ y imply x = y. (19)
Proof. Suppose the lattice to be distributive. Then using repeatedly the Equations
(12), (10), and (17), we have
x = x∧ (a∨ x) = x∧ (a∨ y) = (x∧a)∨ (x∧ y)
= (a∧ y)∨ (x∧ y) = (a∨ x)∧ y = (a∨ y)∧ y = y.
The converse is proved in [5, §II.7].
Expressions involving the symbols ∧, ∨ and elements of a lattice are called
lattice polynomials
Lemma 13. In any lattice L, the sublattice S generated by two elements x and y
consists of x, y, u, and v, where u = x∨ y and v = x∧ y, as in Figure 3.
Proof. By (12), x∧u = x; by (11), (9), x∨u = x∨ (x∨ y) = (x∨ x)∨ y = x∨ y =
u. The other cases are analogous, using symmetry in x and y and duality.
u
x y
v
Figure 3: The lattice F2 ∼= 22. For 22, we have v = 00, x = 01, y = 10, and u = 11.
A lattice morphism is a mapping µ : L→ K from a lattice L to a lattice K which
preserves the meet and join operations, i.e., µ(x∧ y) = µ(x)∧ µ(y), µ(x∨ y) =
µ(x)∨µ(y) for all x, y ∈ L.
Corollary 14. Let F2 ∼= 22 be the lattice of Figure 3, and let a, b ∈ L be two
elements of an arbitrary lattice. Then the mapping x 7→ a, y 7→ b can be extended
to a lattice morphism µ : F2 → L.
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The preceding results are usually summarized in the statement that F2 is the
“free lattice” with generators x, y. It has just four elements and is distributive; in
fact it is a Boolean lattice.
Lattice polynomials in three or more variables can be extremely complicated.
However, in a distributive lattice any polynomial can be brought to a normal form,
similarly as a real or complex polynomial can be written as a sum of products,
p(x1, . . . , xn) = ∑ri=1
(
∏s(i)j=1 xi j
)
or as a product of its divisors, p(x1, . . . , xn) =
∏δ
(
∑ j∈Tδ x j
)
.
Theorem 15. In a distributive lattice L, every polynomial p : Ln → L of n variables
is equivalent to a join of meets, and dually:
p(x1, . . . ,xn) =
∨
α∈A
( ∧
i∈Sα
xi
)
=
∧
δ∈D
( ∨
j∈Tδ
x j
)
, (20)
where Sα and Tδ are nonempty sets of indices.
Proof. Each single xi can be so written, where A (or D, respectively) is the family
of sets consisting of the single element set {xi}. On the other hand, we have by
(9)–(11) ∨
α∈A
( ∧
i∈Sα
xi
)
∨
∨
β∈B
( ∧
i∈Sβ
xi
)
=
∨
γ∈A∪B
(∧
i∈Sγ
xi
)
. (21)
Using the distributive law, we have similarly
∨
α∈A
( ∧
i∈Sα
xi
)
∨
∨
β∈B
( ∧
i∈Sβ
xi
)
=
∨
γ∈A×B
( ∧
i∈Sα∪Sβ
xi
)
. (22)
The assertion follows from (10) and (17), combined with the relation (∧S xi)∧
(
∧
T xi) =
∧
S∪T xi, which follows from (9)–(11).
Equation (22) is the lattice generalization of the distributive law of ordinary
algebra, (
∑
α∈A
xα
)(
∑
β∈B
yβ
)
= ∑
(i, j)∈A×B
xiy j.
3 Logics
A general logic is now going to be introduced as a lattice with universal bounds
and a special operation, the fuzzy negation. Here the fuzzy negation of a lattice
element x is the square root of a unique supremum x′′ of x, cf. Eq. (23). Con-
sidering the elements of the lattice as propositions, each proposition then implies
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its double negation, but not always vice versa. Furthermore, the negation is an-
titone, a property which turns out to be equivalent to the disjunctive De Morgan
law, and the Boolean boundary condition for the universal bounds holds true. If
nothing else is assumed, then the lattice is a fuzzy logic. If in addition the law of
non-contradiction holds, then it is a logic. In this way, the notion “fuzzy logic” in-
cludes the propositional structures of substructural logics focussing on validity and
premise combination [38], infinite-valued fuzzy logics of Łukasiewiczian type [9,
§2.3.2], as well as quantum and distributive logics, in particular Boolean algebras
or nonclassical Heyting-Brouwerian (“intuitionistic”) logics [5, §XII.3] in which
“tertium non datur” or “reductio ad absurdum” are not valid. A fuzzy logic is not
necessarily distributive, not even orthomodular or paraconsistent. Quantum logics
will turn out to be orthomodular, but not necessarily distributive.
Creation comes when you learn to say no.
Madonna, The Power of Goodbye
Definition 16. Let L be a lattice with universal bounds 0 and 1, i.e., 0 ≦ x≦ 1 for
all x ∈ L. A mapping ′ : L → L, x 7→ x′, is called fuzzy negation, if the following
relations hold for all x, y ∈ L:
(Weak double negation) x≦ (x′)′, (23)
(Antitony) y′ ≦ x′ if x≦ y, (24)
(Boolean boundary condition) 0′ = 1, 1′ = 0. (25)
The pair (L, ′) then is called a fuzzy logic, and the elements x ∈ L are called propo-
sitions. If for the fuzzy negation the “law of non-contradiction”
x∧ x′ = 0 (26)
holds for all x∈ L, then it is called (non-contradictory) negation and (L, ′) is a logic.
As long as misunderstanding is excluded, we shortly write L instead of (L, ′).
Algebraically, the element x′ ∈ L in a (non-contradictory) logic L is called a
pseudo-complement of x ∈ L; if in addition x∨ x′ = 1, then x′ is called a com-
plement of x ∈ L. In general, a lattice is called (pseudo-) complemented if all its
elements have (pseudo-) complements. A mapping ′: L → L, x 7→ x′ in a (pseudo-)
complemented lattice L, assigning to each element x a (pseudo-) complement, is
called (pseudo-) complementation. If the (pseudo-) complementation is bijective,
the lattice is called uniquely (pseudo-) complemented. ♦
Defined this way, a logic is a special fuzzy logic. In any fuzzy logic L the rela-
tion x≦ y will be interpreted as the statement “x implies y.” The propositions x∧ y
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and x∨ y will be interpreted as “x and y” and “x or y,” respectively. The universal
bounds of a logic are usually denoted by 0 and 1, the proposition 1 expresses truth,
and the proposition 0 expresses falsehood or absurdity.
Theorem 17. Let be L a lattice and ′ : L → L a mapping satisfying (23) for all
x ∈ L. Then ′ is antitone if and only if the disjunctive De Morgan law holds, i.e.,
(x∨ y)′ = x′∧ y′ for all x, y ∈ L. (27)
Proof. Suppose first the antitony of ′, and let u := x∨y and v := x′∧y′ for arbitrary
x, y ∈ L. Then u ≧ x and u ≧ y, as well as v ≦ x′ and v ≦ y′. By the antitony, this
means that u′ ≦ x′ and u′ ≦ y′, as well as v′ ≧ x′ and v′ ≧ y′, i.e.,
u′ ≦ x′∧ y′ = v, (28)
as well as v′ ≧ x′ ∨ y′ = u. By (23) and the antitony, the last inequality yields
v≦ v′′ ≦ u′ which means together with (28) that u′ = v.
Assume, on the other hand, the disjunctive De Morgan law (27). Since y= x∨y
for x≦ y, we have y′ = (x∨ y)′ = x′∧ y′ with (27), hence y′ ≦ x′.
Theorem 18. In a general fuzzy logic L the conjunctive De Morgan inequality
(x∧ y)′ ≧ x′∨ y′. (29)
holds for all x, y ∈ L.
Proof. Since (x′ ∨ y′)′ = x′′ ∧ y′′ ≧ x∧ y by (27) and (23) for all x, y ∈ L, we have
x′∨ y′ ≦ ((x′∨ y′)′)′ ≦ (x∧ y)′ by (23) and the antitony of the negation.
Note that the conjunctive De Morgan law (see Eq. (33 below) does not neces-
sarily hold in a fuzzy logic, even not in a logic.
Remark 19. If we abandon the Boolean boundary condiditon (25) on a negation,
then very little is known about the fuzzy negations of 0 and 1 in a general fuzzy
logic. By the antitony (24) and by the general lattice property 0 ≦ x ≦ 1 for all
x ∈ L, we only can derive
1′ ≦ x′ ≦ 0′ for all x ∈ L. (30)
A fuzzy negation with 0′ = 0 thus must be constant, i.e., x′ = 0 for all x ∈ L. On
the other hand, a constant fuzzy negation x′ = x0 ∈ L for all x ∈ L implies x0 = 0,
since otherwise we had 0′′ = x0 > 0, contradicting (23). In a logic with the law of
non-contradiction x∧ x′ = 0, however, we have
1′ = 0, (31)
since 1∧ y = y for all y ∈ L. ♦
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Remark 20. Sometimes the notions “strong” and “weak negation” are used, espe-
cially in the context of logic programming [7] and artificial intelligence, motivated
by the following ideas. Intuitively speaking, strong negation captures the presence
of explicit negative information, while weak negation captures the absence of pos-
itive information. In computer science, weak negation captures the computational
concept of negation-as-failure (or “closed-world negation”).
A strong negation (′) can be interpreted as “impossible.” Negating this, in
turn, gives a weak “not impossible” assertion, so that x implies (x′)′, i.e, x ≦ (x′)′,
but not vice versa. With this negation, the rule of bivalence x∨ x′ = 1 (x is true
or impossible) does not necessarily hold (since x is possible as long as it is not
recognized as true), but the corresponding x∧x′ = 0 (not both true and impossible)
does. Weak negation, in contrast, can be regarded as “unconfirmed.” Negating
this gives x ≦ (x′)′ (if x is true it is always unconfirmed that it is unconfirmed),
but not vice versa (x′)′ ≦ x (if it is not confirmed that x is unconfirmed, then x
is certainly true). However, it has x∨ x′ = 1 (x is true or unconfirmed) holding,
since if x is not true it is certainly not confirmed, but not necessarily x∧ x′ = 0
(it is never confirmed that x is true and unconfirmed), since x may be true but not
confirmed. Defining such kind of weak negation therefore implies that tertium non
datur x∨ x′ = 1 does hold, but the law of contradiction is not necessarily true,
x∧ x′ ≧ 0. Likewise, the ability to speak of the uncertain apparently may force a
weakening of the tertium non datur in some form, losing double negation, and also
of the law of contradiction. Both possibilities are enabled by the above concept of
a fuzzy logic.
However, there is some confusion with the term “strong negation.” Sometimes
it simply means the classical negation “false” = “not true.” Negating this gives
another strong assertion, (x′)′ ≦ x (if it is false that x is false, then x is true), and
vice versa. This has x∨ x′ = 1 (x is true or false) and x∧ x′ = 0 (x is not both true
and false) holding. ♦
What are the reasons that the conjunctive version (Eq. (33) below) is not im-
plied by the antitony of the negation? In fact, it is easily proved that for lattices
with a total order (i.e., ∀x, y either x≦ y or y≦ x) antitony, disjunctive De Morgan
law and conjunctive De Morgan law are equivalent. However, in a partially ordered
set this is not necessarily true. One of the simplest counterexamples is M5.
Example 21. Let L = M5 denote the modular lattice as in Figure 4 and define the
operation ′ : M5 →M5 by
x 0 a b c 1
x′ 1 c 0 a 0 (32)
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1
a b c
0
Figure 4: The non-distributive modular lattice M5.
Then x′′ = x for all x 6= b, but b′′ = 1 > b, and antitony is easily verified. Since
moreover x∧x′ = 0 for all x ∈M5, ′ is a non-contradictory negation and (M5, ′) is a
logic. However, in contrast to the disjunctive De Morgan law (27), the conjunctive
De Morgan law (33) is not valid since, e.g., (a∧b)′ = 1 but a′∨b′ = c. ♦
Theorem 22. (De Morgan’s conjunctive law) If in a fuzzy logic L we have (x′)′
= x for all x ∈ L, then the conjunctive De Morgan law holds,
(x∧ y)′ = x′∨ y′. (33)
Proof. Let (x′)′ = x. By (27) we obtain (x′ ∨ y′)′ = x∧ y, hence x′ ∨ y′ = ((x′ ∨
y′)′)′ = (x∧ y)′.
For a non-contradictory logic the above theorem has a stronger consequence.
Theorem 23. (Tertium non datur) In a logic L, a negation with (x′)′ = x for all x
∈ L implies the law “tertium non datur”, or “law of excluded middle,” x∨ x′ = 1.
Proof. By Theorem 22, De Morgan’s laws (27) and (33) hold, and hence the prop-
erty x∧x′ = 0 for all x∈ L implies (x′∨x)′ = x′′∧x′ = 0, i.e., x′∨x= 1 by (25).
In general, a non-contradictory negation satisfying the law tertium non datur is
called ortho-negation [38], complemented negation, or involutive negation, and
(L, ′) a complemented logic.
Example 24. [41, §2.2] The tertium non datur is a highly nontrivial assumption.
An example for its nonconstructive feature is a proof of the following proposition:
“There exist irrational numbers x, y∈R\Q with xy ∈Q.” Proof: Either√2
√
2 ∈Q,
i.e., x = y =
√
2; or
√
2
√
2 /∈Q, then (√2
√
2)
√
2 = 2 ∈ Q, i.e., x = √2
√
2
, y =
√
2.
Q.E.D. The question whether or not √2
√
2 is rational, however, remains unsolved
in the proof. ♦
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lattice
ց
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modal logic
paraconsis-
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quantum
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✷,✸ր
∃, ∀−→ first-orderlogicր ր
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Figure 5: The algebraic hierarchy of logics. In particular, a Boolean logic is a special quantum
logic, a quantum logic is a special fuzzy logic. By Theorem 28, a logic with the law tertium non
datur is a quantum logic. Establishing Boolean logic with the quantifiers ∃ and ∀ yields first-order
logic, and with the quantifiers ✷ and ✸ modal logic.
Definition 25. A paraconsistent logic is a fuzzy logic satisfying the paraconsis-
tency condition
x = y if x≦ y and x′∧ y = 0. (34)
An intuitionistic logic is a distributive logic in which there exists propositions x <
(x′)′. A quantum logic, or orthologic, is a logic satisfying the orthomodular identity
x∨ (x′∧ y) = y if x≦ y, (35)
A Boolean logic is a complemented distributive logic. ♦
Therefore we obtain the algebraic structure of logics in Figure 5. Every dis-
tributive complemented lattice is othomodular, since interchanging x and y and
setting z = x′ for x ≦ y in the distributive law (17) with x∧ y = x, x∧ x′ = 0 und
y = x∨ y yields (35).
Example 26. (The logics BN4 and MO1) A given a lattice may yield the propo-
sitional structure for more than one fuzzy logics, depending on the negation. A
t
b n
f
Figure 6: The lattice F2 ∼= 22, providing the propositional structure of the logics BN4 and MO1.
simple example is the Boolean lattice 22. Defining two negations x∼ and x⊥ by the
following tables,
x t b n f
x∼ f b n t
x t b n f
x⊥ f n b t (36)
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we obtain the logics [38, §8.2], [41, §2.4]
BN4 = ({ f ,n,b, t}, ∼), MO1 = ({ f ,n,b, t}, ⊥), (37)
Both negations may be illustrated geometrically, supposing f , n, b, t as the four
points on the unit circle S1 in the plane R2, viz., f =(0,−1), n=(1,0), b=(−1,0),
t = (0,1). The negation ∼ then corresponds to the reflection in the horizontal line
{(x, 0)} through the origin, whereas the negation ⊥ corresponds to a rotation around
the origin by the angle pi . The main differences between the logics BN4 and MO1
are that BN4 is contradictory (e.g., b∧b∼ = b > f ) and that the tertium non datur
does not hold in BN4 (b∨b∼ = b < t), whereas MO1 is a classical Boolean logic.
The fusion and material implication of BN4 read:
∗ f n b t
f f f f f
n f f n n
b f n b t
t f n t t
→ f n b t
f t t t t
n n t n t
b f n b t
t f n f t
(38)
The many-valued logic BN4 considered by Dunn and Belnap was the result of
research on relevance logic, but it also has significance for computer science appli-
cations. The truth degrees may be interpreted as indicating, e.g., with respect to a
database query for some particular state of affairs, that there is no information con-
cerning this state of affairs (n = /0), information saying that the state of affairs fails
( f = {0}), information saying that the state of affairs obtains (t = {1}), conflicting
information saying that the state of affairs obtains as well as fails (b = {0, 1}). ♦
Example 27. The lattice L(Vn) of all linear subspaces of an n-dimensional vector
space Vn (Example 5) is uniquely complemented since the orthogonal complement
V⊥ of any subspace V satisfies V ∧V⊥ = {0} and V ∨V⊥ =Vn. Note that O = {0}
and I = Vn are the universal bounds of L(Vn). Moreover, it is orthomodular, and
the complementation is involutive, (x⊥)⊥ = x. Therefore, L(Vn) is an involutively
complemented logic in which De Morgan’s laws hold. ♦
Theorem 28. A logic is a quantum logic if and only if x = x′′.
Proof. In a quantum logic we have by y= x′′ in (35) that x′′ = x∨(x′∧x′′)= x∨0=
x. Conversely, if x = x′′, then from (27), (33) and (15) we deduce
(x∨ (x′∧ y))′ = x′∧ (x′∧ y)′ = x′∧ (x∨ y′)≧ (x′∧ x)∨ (x′∧ y′) = (x∨ y)′, (39)
hence x∨ (x′∧y)≧ x∨y. But x∨ (x′∧y)≦ (x∨x′)∧ (x∨y) by (16), and since with
Theorem 23 x∨ x′ = 1, we have x∨ (x′ ∧ y) ≦ x∨ y. We conclude x∨ (x′ ∧ y) =
x∨ y = y for x≦ y, i.e., (35) holds.
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With Theorem 23, in a quantum logic therefore the law tertium non datur holds,
especially in Boolean logic.
Example 29. A complemented lattice, in which the orthomodular identity does not
hold, is O6 in Figure 7. Although x < y, we have x∨ (x′ ∧ y) = x∨0 = x 6= y. If a
x∨ y′
y
x
x′
y′
0
x∨ y′
y
x
x′
y′
0
Figure 7: The non-orthomodular complemented lattice O6. If x′ ∧ y > 0, then it forms the lattice
L7 which is orthomodular.
lattice contains O6 as a sublattice, it is non-orthomodular. ♦
4 Fuzzy logics
Propositions of every-day language, for instance “Tom is big” or “The room is
cold,” often are very vaguely defined and cannot always be answered by a definite
yes or no. Traditional mathematics avoid such vagueness by precise definitions and
clear notional scopes. This concept undoubtedly is very successful, but it simply
excludes vague notions such as “big.”
The problem is not our principal inability to precise “big” or “cold.” It would
be quite easy to determine that a man is “big” if he has a height greater than 1.90 m,
and that a room is “cold” if its temperature is smaller than 17◦C. The actual prob-
lem is that the boundary between “big” and “normal” is not exactly at 1.90 m, or
the transition between “cold” and “warm” not abruptly at 17◦, i.e., that there is
a blurred transition between these characteristics in which they hold simultane-
ously. The traditional mathematical modelling is not able to represent this issue.
In 1965, Zadeh therefore introduced the concept of fuzzy sets [45], leading to an
entire mathematical branch, in particular to fuzzy logic.
In a fuzzy logic L a proposition a usually is identified with a membership func-
tion µA : X → [0,1] for a subset A⊂ X of a given universe X . The universe X is an
arbitrary set whose elements are objects of the real world or its quantifiable (“mea-
surable”) properties, for instance a subset of R representing the height of a person
or the temperature of a room, or a discrete subset of combinations of persons,
symptomes and diagnoses [26, §7.1.13]. The value µA(x) specifies the degree of
membership which the element x ∈ X has with respect to the subset A⊂ X , i.e., the
truth value of proposition a for the element x. This way, the membership function
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µA generalizes the characteristic function χA : X →{0,1} of a set A,
χA(x) =
{
0 if x ∈ A,
1 if x /∈ A,
where “x ∈ A” is to be identified with the proposition µA(x) = “the measured value
x is in A.” In this paper, we directly identify the proposition a(x) with its member-
ship function, i.e., a(x) = µa(x). A fuzzy logic L then is the set L = {a : X → [0,1]}
of membership functions on a given set X . The fuzzy logic is contradictory if and
only if there exists at least one proposition a ∈ L with 0 < a(x)< 1 for some x ∈ X .
Usually, for a fuzzy logic L the connectives ∧ and ∨ for all g, f ∈ L, are defined
pointwise by
f (x)∧g(x) = min( f (x),g(x)), f (x)∨g(x) = max( f (x),g(x)). (40)
Moreover, the constant functions 0 and 1 ∈ L are the universal bounds of L.
4.1 t-norms and the derivation of negations
Definition 30. [26, 30, 25] A t-norm (“triangular norm”) is a binary operation
∗ : [0,1]2 → [0,1] satisfying the following conditions for all x, y, z ∈ [0,1]:
(commutativity) x∗ y = y∗ x (41)
(associativity) (x∗ y)∗ z = x∗ (y∗ z) (42)
(monotony) x∗ z≦ y∗ z if x≦ y (43)
(boundary condition) 1∗ x = x, (44)
♦
By the boundary condition we have especially 1∗0 = 0, i.e., by commutativity
and monotony 0 ∗ x = 0. In fuzzy set theory t-norms are used to model the in-
tersection of two fuzzy sets and therefore equivalently refer to the logical term of
conjunction. Consequently, t-norms may be used to derive a logical structure.
Lemma 31. Let ∗ be a continuous t-norm. Then for each pair x, y ∈ [0,1], the
element
x→ y := sup{z ∈ [0,1] : x∗ z≦ y} (45)
is well-defined. It is called the residuum of the t-norm, or material implication.
Proof. [26, Lemma 2.1.4]
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In this way, a given continuous t-norm uniquely implies a material implication
[26, Lemma 2.1.4], and by the definition x′ := (x→ 0) also uniquely a negation.
In the context of logics, the t-norms are also called fusion or multiplicative
conjunction. In general, the fusion f ∗ g is the proposition which is false to the
degree that the sum of f and g is false, whereas f → g is the proposition which
is false to the extent that f is truer than g. It mirrors in the language of formulae
the behavior of the concatenation of premises X in “sequents” X ⊢ A stating that A
can be derived from the structure X (which may be a theory, e.g.), by holding the
“introduction rule” and the “elimination rule”
X ⊢ A Y ⊢ B
X ;Y ⊢ A∗B ,
X ⊢ A∗B Y (A;B) ⊢C
Y (X) ⊢C (46)
They mean that, if X is a premise for A and Y a premise for B then X ;Y is a premise
for A ∗B; if on the other hand, X is enough for A ∗B and Y (A;B) is a premise for
C then we can replace the reference to A;B in Y by a claim to X . So, A ∗B is the
formula equivalent to the structure A;B.
We observe at this point that, in contrast to an implicative lattice (cf. Def. 65),
the residuum and therefore the negation is not determined by the lattice meet oper-
ation ∧ but by the additional fusion operation ∗. The following continuous t-norms
are important for fuzzy logics.
Example 32. (Łukasiewicz logic) The Łukasiewicz t-norm is defined as
f ∗Ł g = max( f +g−1, 0). (47)
It uniquely determines the Łukasiewicz implication →Ł and the Łukasiewicz nega-
tion ¬Ł as
f →Ł g = min(1− f +g,1), ¬Ł f = 1− f . (48)
Since for 0 < f < 1 we have f ∧¬Ł f = min( f ,1− f ) > 0 as well as f ∨¬Ł f =
max( f ,1− f ) < 1, in the fuzzy logic (L,¬Ł) both the law of non-contradiction
and tertium non datur do not hold. With f = ¬Ł f , and Theorem 22, however, the
conjunctive De Morgan law (33) is valid. ♦
Example 33. (Go¨del logic) The Go¨del t-norm is defined as
f ∗G g = min( f ,g) = f ∧g. (49)
It uniquely determines the Go¨del implication →G and the Go¨del negation ¬G as
f →G g =
{
1 if f ≦ g,
g if f > g. ¬G f = δ ( f ) =
{
1 if f = 0,
0 if f > 0. (50)
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Since for 0≦ f ≦ 1 we have f ∧¬G f =min( f ,δ ( f )) = 0 the fuzzy logic (L,¬G) is
non-contradictory and therefore a logic. However, by f ∨¬G f = max( f ,δ ( f ))< 1
for 0 < f < 1, the tertium non datur does not hold in it. Moreover, with ¬G( f ∧g)
= δ (min( f ,g)) and ¬G f ∨¬Gg = max(δ ( f ),δ (g)) we have either δ (min( f ,g)) =
δ (0) = 1 = max(δ ( f ),δ (g)) if f g = 0, or δ (min( f ,g)) = 0 = max(δ ( f ),δ (g)) if
f g > 0, and therefore the conjunctive De Morgan law (33) does hold. ♦
Example 34. (Product logic) The product t-norm ∗Π is defined as
f ∗Π g = f ·g. (51)
It uniquely determines the Goguen implication →Π and the Go¨del negation ¬G as
f →Π g =
{
1 if f ≦ g,
g/ f if f > g. ¬G f = δ ( f ) =
{
1 if f = 0,
0 if f > 0. . (52)
Since the negation of the product logic coincides with the Go¨del negation (50),
fuzzy logic (L,¬G) is non-contradictory with the De Morgan laws holding. ♦
By Examples 33 and 34 we observe that the same negation allows for different
consistent residuum structures.
There are considerable generalizations of the notion of a t-norm, for instance
to the case of two dimensions leading to the intuitionistic fuzzy logic defined in the
next example. On a lattice structure of a subset of R2, however, a t-norm does not
imply a negation, any negation may be compatible with it [16, §8.3.3].
Example 35. (Triangular intuitionistic logic L∗) [16] Let
L∗ = {x = (x1,x2) ∈ [0,1]2 : x1 + x2 ≦ 1} (53)
denote the triangular surface in the plane with vertices (0,0), (1,0), and (0,1), and
let ≤∗ be defined for all x, y ∈ L∗ by
(x1,x2)≤∗ (y1,y2) if and only if x1 ≦ y1 and x2 ≧ y2 (54)
Then (L∗,≤∗) is a poset. The partial order in L∗ is illustrated in Figure 8. For a
given point x ∈ L∗, the white regions contain the points y ∈ L∗ which cannot be
compared to x by the partial order ≤∗, whereas the light gray area consists of the
points y≥∗ x and the upper dark gray area the points y≤∗ x. With the definitions
x∧ y = (min[x1,y1],max[x2,y2]), x∨ y = (max[x1,y1],min[x2,y2]) (55)
L∗ is a lattice with universal bounds 0∗ = (0,1) and 1∗ = (1,0). Moreover, it
is distributive since in each component the order is total [5, §I.6]. The standard
negation on L∗ is given by
(x1,x2)
′ = (x2,x1). (56)
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(0,1)
(0,0)
(1,0)
xx2
x1
≤∗ x
≥∗ x
Figure 8: The poset (L∗,≤∗) of Example 35, and the subsets of points comparable to an x ∈ L∗.
It is involutive and satisfies both De Morgan laws, as is directly verified. Since for
x ∈ L∗, with 0 < xi < 1 for at least one i ∈ {1,2}, we have
x∧ x′ = (min[x1,x2], max[x1,x2])>∗ 0∗ (57)
and
x∨ x′ = (max[x1,x2], min[x1,x2])<∗ 1∗, (58)
L∗ does neither satisfy the law of non-contradiction nor the tertium non datur. ♦
4.2 Examples of finite and discrete fuzzy logics
Example 36. (Finite Łukasiewicz logics) [38, §8.2] For n ∈ N, the Łukasiewicz
logic Łn+1 is a well-known (n+1)-valued logic with the constant truth values
Łn+1 =
({
0, 1
n
, 2
n
, . . . , n−1
n
,1
}
,¬Ł
)
. (59)
Especially for n = 2 we obtain Ł3 = {0, 12 ,1}, i.e.,
f ¬Ł f
0 1
1
2
1
2
1 0
∧ 0 12 1
0 0 0 0
1
2 0
1
2
1
2
1 0 12 1
∨ 0 12 1
0 0 12 1
1
2
1
2
1
2 1
1 1 1 1
∗Ł 0 12 1
0 0 0 0
1
2 0 0
1
2
1 0 12 1
→Ł 0 12 1
0 1 1 1
1
2
1
2 1 1
1 0 12 1
(60)
Notably, by the fusion 12 ∗Ł 12 = 0 we do not have f ≦ f ∗Ł f in general, i.e., the
fusion in Ł3 does not obey the “law of weak contraction.” Since this is one of the
so-called structural laws, Ł3 is a “substructural logic” [38]. Ł3 is equivalent to the
( f ,n, t) fragment of BN4 (Def. 26). We can extend the domain of propositions to
ŁQ = [0,1]∩Q, or to ŁR = [0,1]. ♦
Example 37. (Finite Go¨del logics) For n ∈N, the Go¨del logic Gn+1 is an (n+1)-
valued logic with the constant truth values
Gn+1 =
({
0, 1
n
, 2
n
, . . . , n−1
n
,1
}
,¬G
)
. (61)
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Especially for n = 2 we obtain G3 = {0, 12 ,1}, i.e.,
f ¬G f
0 1
1
2 0
1 0
∧ 0 12 1
0 0 0 0
1
2 0
1
2
1
2
1 0 12 1
∨ 0 12 1
0 0 12 1
1
2
1
2
1
2 1
1 1 1 1
→G 0 12 1
0 1 1 1
1
2 0 1 1
1 0 12 1
(62)
Note that the residuum ∗G equals the meet operation ∧ of the lattice. G3 is also
known as the Heyting lattice H3 [38, §8.46]. ♦
Example 38. (Sugihara models of RM2n+1) For n ∈N, the logic RM2n+1 (where
RM stands for “relevant logic with mingle” [38, §2.7]) is given by
RM2n+1 = ({−n,−n−1, . . . ,−1,0,1,2, . . . ,n}, −) (63)
with the negation a′ =−a, and fusion and material implication defined as
a∗b =
{
a∧b if a≦−b,
a∨b if a >−b, a→ b =
{ −a∨b if a≦ b,
−a∧b if a < b. (64)
Fusion is communitative and associative, with identity 0, and we have a ∗ a = a
for all a ∈ RM2n+1. Moreover, the negation satisfies the De Morgan laws, but
by 0∨ (−0) = 0, tertium non datur does not hold. For instance, n = 1 yields the
three-valued logic RM3 = ({−1,0,1},−) where
a −a
−1 1
0 0
1 −1
∧ −1 0 1
−1 −1 −1 −1
0 −1 0 0
1 −1 0 1
∨ −1 0 1
−1 −1 0 1
0 0 0 1
1 1 1 1
(65)
and
∗ −1 0 1
−1 −1 −1 −1
0 −1 0 1
1 −1 1 1
→ −1 0 1
−1 1 1 1
0 −1 0 1
1 −1 −1 1
(66)
Hence RM3 is equivalent to the ( f ,b, t) fragment of BN4 (Def. 26). The model can
be extended to the infinite-valued logic RM = (Z,−), however as a lattice it has
no universal lower and upper bounds O =−∞, I = ∞. ♦
Example 39. Consider the three propositions a, b, c : X → [0,1] on the universe
X = (−273,15;∞) ⊂ R, a(x) = “x is cold,” b(x) = “x is warm,” c(x) = “x is hot.”
For a measurement outcome x ∈ X , they are defined as the functions (cf. Figure 9)
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1
0.5
a(x) “cold”
x
0 10 20 30 ◦C
1
0.5
b(x) “warm”
x
0 10 20 30 ◦C
1
0.5
c(x) “hot”
x
0 10 20 30 ◦C
Figure 9: The membership functions a(x) = µa(x), b(x) = µb(x), c(x) = µc(x).
a(x) =


1 x≦ 5,
15−x
10 5 < x≦ 15,
0 otherwise,
b(x) =


x−5
10 5 < x≦ 15,
1 15 < x≦ 25,
35−x
10 25 < x≦ 35,
0 otherwise,
c(x) =


0 x≦ 25,
x−25
10 25 < x≦ 35,
1 otherwise.
With the operations in (40) and the Łukasiewicz negation (48) applied pointwise,
i.e., f ′(x) = ¬Ł f (x), we have a(x)∧ b(x)∧ c(x) = 0 and a(x)∨ b(x)∨ c(x) ≧ 12
for all x ∈ X , as is evident from Figure 10. Moreover, the emerging fuzzy logic
1
0.5
a(x) “cold” b(x) “warm” c(x) “hot”
x
0 10 20 30 ◦C
Figure 10: The membership functions a(x), b(x), c(x), summarized into a single diagram.
is contradictory since f ∧ f ′ 6= 0 for f = a, b, c (Figure 11). For instance, a tem-
1
0.5
(a∧a′)(x)
x
0 10 20 30 ◦C
1
0.5
(b∧b′)(x)
x
0 10 20 30 ◦C
1
0.5
(c∧ c′)(x)
x
0 10 20 30 ◦C
Figure 11: The meets a∧ a′ (“cold and not cold”), b∧ b′ (“warm and not warm”), c∧ c′ (“hot and
not hot”). They all are not identical to 0, thus the fuzzy logic they form is contradictory. Notice that
b∧b′ = (a∧a′)∨ (c∧ c′).
perature of 10◦C is “cold and not cold” with a truth value 12 , and also “warm and
not warm” with a truth value 12 . As a lattice, the fuzzy logic is depicted in Figure
12. Notice that, e.g., b∧b′ = (a∧a′)∨ (c∧ c′). It is non-orthomodular since, e.g.,
a∨ (a′ ∧ b′) = a′ ∧ b′ 6= b′ although a < b′. Note that it does not contain O6 as a
sublattice. ♦
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1
c∨ c′ a∨a′
c′ b∨b′ a′
a∨b b′ b∨ c
b′ ∧ c′ b a′ ∧b′
a b∧b′ c
a∧a′ c∧ c′
0
Figure 12: The lattice of the fuzzy logic in Ex. 39, right hand the respective func-
tion graphs.
5 Quantum logics
Historically, it was soon recognized that quantum mechanics involved departures
from classical Boolean logic, most strikingly the Heisenberg uncertainty principle
and the related principle of the noncommutativity of physical observations. Since
the experimental verification of the distributive laws for an algebra of attributes is
based on the permutability and repeatability of physical observations, distributivity
appeared inappropriate for a logic of projective quantum measurements. In addi-
tion, the Boolean concept of negation had to be modified, since negating quantum
attributes is based on the orthogonality of subspaces of a Hilbert space and not on
the complements of subsets of a set.
In 1936, Birkhoff and von Neumann [6] suggested to replace the distributivity
condition by the weaker modularity condition. In general, however, the lattice of
projections of a Hilbert space is not modular but only orthomodular. It is mod-
ular if and only if the Hilbert space is finite-dimensional, and it is distributive if
and only if it is one-dimensional. Thus the requirement that the lattice of proposi-
tions be modular rules out the prototype quantum mechanical infinite-dimensional
Hilbert space of Schro¨dinger’s wavefunctions. Nonetheless, the idea remained and
became explicit in Mackey’s programme [31] as a set of axioms, framing a conser-
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vative generalized probability theory, that underwrite the construction of a logic of
experimental propositions, or, in his terminology, “questions,” having the structure
of a σ -orthomodular poset.
The observables of quantum mechanics are assumed to be Hermitian operators
acting on a Hilbert space H . Therefore, if one defines an observable attribute of
a quantum-mechanical state |ψ〉 as a statement of the form that the observation M
on |ψ〉 will give a value λ in a Borel set S ⊂ R, then |ψ〉 has the attribute (M,S)
with probability 1 if and only if |ψ〉 is in a closed subspace X of H . If S′ is the
complement of S (as the set S′ =R\S), then the negation of (M,S) is certain if and
only if |ψ〉 ∈ X⊥, where X⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement of X .
If every such pair (M,S) is assumed to correspond to an observable attribute,
then it follows that any closed subspace H of Hilbert space represents an attribute
observable “with certainty” if and only if |ψ〉 ∈H .
Axiom 40 (Mackey’s Axiom VII). The partially ordered set of all propositions
(“questions”) about a quantum system is isomorphic to the partially ordered set
L(H ) of all closed subspaces of a separable, infinite dimensional Hilbert space.
For Mackey, the outstanding problem was to explain why the poset of questions
ought to be isomorphic to L(H ).
“This axiom has rather a different character from Axioms I through
VI. These all had some degree of physical naturalness and plausibil-
ity. Axiom VII seems entirely ad hoc. Why do we make it? Can we
justify making it? Ideally, one would like to have a list of physically
plausible assumptions from which one could deduce Axiom VII. Short
of this one would like a list from which one could deduce a set of pos-
sibilities for the structure . . . all but one of which could be shown to
be inconsistent with suitably planned experiments.” [31, pp. 71–72]
This problem is still unresolved. Even worse, rather natural examples of com-
posite quantum systems [1, 22] are known to violate orthomodularity or an equiv-
alent structure, although in each of their single subsystems it does hold true. These
examples put serious doubts on the universality of the original Mackey programme.
The question of how to determine logics of general composite quantum systems is
under current research [2, 36, 40, 44].
5.1 Subspaces in Hilbert space
Observe that |ψ〉 ∈ X1 ∩ X2 for two closed subspaces X1, X2 ⊂ H means that
successive measurements of a system in the state |ψ〉 will certainly verify the pre-
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dictions (H1,S1) and (H2,S2) corresponding to X1 and X2, respectively. Thus, like
the orthocomplement X⊥, X1∧X2 has a simple and direct physical meaning.
The lattice of projections of a Hilbert space is in fact a complete lattice, i.e.,
arbitrary sets of propositions, whether mutually orthogonal or not, countable or
not, have well-defined suprema and infima.
Throughout this section, H will denote an arbitrary separable Hilbert space.
Definition 41. A set M ⊂H is a linear manifold in H if for all x, y ∈ M and
all constants z ∈C, both x+ y and zx belong to M . ♦
If H is finite-dimensional, a linear manifold is just a “vector subspace.” In
the infinite-dimensional case, however, the term “subspace” is reserved for certain
kinds of manifolds (Def. 46).
Definition 42. A set S⊂H is closed if every Cauchy sequence in S converges in
norm to a vector in S. ♦
Let, for a general collection of sets S , denote ∩S the intersection of all sets
of S , i.e., ∩S = {x: x ∈ S for every S ∈S }.
Theorem 43. If S is a collection of closed subsets of H , then ∩S is a closed set
in H .
Proof. Suppose {xk}k is a Cauchy sequence in ∩S , which converges to a x ∈H .
Then for all sets C ∈S , {xk}k is a Cauchy sequence in C, and since C is closed, x
must belong to C. Hence x ∈ ∩S .
Definition 44. For a set S⊂H , we define the closure of S by
clos(S) = ∩{C ⊂H : S⊂C, and C closed} (67)
♦
Observe from Theorem 43 that clos(S) is a closed set. From the definition of
intersection, it is a subset of every closed set containing S.
Example 45. (Counterexample) Let H be a two-dimensional Hilbert space and
S = {x ∈ H : ‖x‖ < 1} its inner unit disc. Suppose 0 6= x ∈ S, and consider the
sequence defined by
xk =
( 1
‖x‖ −
1
k
)
x
for all k ∈ N. Since ‖(1/‖x‖− 1/k)x‖ < (1/‖x‖)‖x‖ = 1, we have xk ∈ S for all
k ∈N. Moreover, xk−x/‖x‖ = −x/k, i.e., ‖(xk−x/‖x‖)‖ = ‖x‖/k → 0 as k→∞.
Hence xk is a Cauchy sequence converging to x˜ = x/‖x‖, but x˜ /∈ S. That means, S
is not closed. ♦
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Definition 46. A subspace in a Hilbert space H is a closed linear manifold in H .
♦
Example 47. Let H = l2 be the vector space
l2 = {{xk}k : xk ∈ C such that
∞
∑
k=1
|xk|2 < ∞}, (68)
together with the inner product 〈x,y〉 = ∑∞k=1 xky∗k . (l2 is a complex vector space,
since if x, y ∈ l2, then also ax+ by ∈ l2 for any constants a, b ∈ C; moreover, the
series ∑∞k=1 xky∗k converges, since 0 ≦ (|xk − |yk|)2 = |xk|2 − 2|xk||yk|+ |yk|2, i.e.,
2|xky∗k | = 2|xk||yk| ≦ |xk|2 + |yk|2. Thus, ∑k |xk||y∗k | ≦ 12 (∑k |xk|2 +∑k |yk|2), and
both series on the right converge because x, y ∈ l2.) Define now the subset
S = {{xk}k ∈ l2 : xk = 0 for all but a finite number of k}. (69)
Then S is a linear manifold, since for x = {xk}k, y = {yk}k ∈ S, also the series
ax + by = {axk + byk} for a, b ∈ C are in l2, since there still are only finitely
many series member non-vanishing. However, S is not closed, since for instance
the series {xk}k where each xk again is a series xk = {x jk} j defined by
x
j
k =
{ √
1/2 j if j ≦ k,
0 if j > k
is a Cauchy sequence in S, {xk}k ∈ S, which converges in norm to x = {
√
1/2 j} j,
but x /∈ S. ♦
Example 48. Suppose [a,b] ⊂ R is a closed real interval, and let L2(a,b) denote
the Hilbert space of (Lebesgue-) square-integrable functions on (a,b). Then the
following sets are linear manifolds in L2(a,b).
C[a,b] = { f : [a,b]→ C : f is continuous} (70)
C∞[a,b] = { f : [a,b]→ C : f is infinitely often differentiable} (71)
If f is continuous on [a,b], then | f |2 is also continuous and hence integrable, i.e.,
C[a,b] ⊂ L2(a,b). From this and from the fact that functions are continuous at all
points where they are differentiable, we have
C∞[a,b] ⊂C[a,b]⊂ L2(a,b). (72)
That C∞[a,b] and C[a,b] are linear manifolds in L2(a,b) follows from standard
theorems in calculus. However, neither of these manifolds is closed in L2(a,b). On
the other hand, the closure of C[a,b] is L2(a,b). ♦
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Definition 49. If S ⊆H , we define the span of S by
spanS = ∩{K ⊆H : K is a subspace in H with S⊆ K}. (73)
Two vectors x, y ∈ H of a Hilbert space H are called orthogonal, in symbols
x⊥y, if 〈x,y〉 = 0. If S ⊂H , we define the orthogonal complement S⊥ of S as the
subset S⊥ = {x ∈H : x⊥s for all s ∈ S}. If S is a collection of subsets of H , we
write ∨
S∈S
S := span(
⋃
S∈S
S), and
∧
S∈S
S := span(
⋂
S∈S
S). (74)
♦
For the intersection of two subspaces X , Y in H we have simply X∧Y =X∩Y .
Cf. the finite-dimensional analog in Example 5.
Theorem 50. Let be S⊂H . Then the following hold:
(i) S⊥∩S = {0};
(ii) S⊥ is a subspace in H (even if S is not);
(iii) S⊆ T ⊆H ⇒ T⊥ ⊆ S;
(iv) S⊆ (S⊥)⊥;
(v) S is a subspace in H ⇒ (S⊥)⊥ = S;
(vi) If S is a collection of subspaces in H then (∨S∈S S)⊥ = ⋂S∈S S⊥, and∨
S∈S S⊥ = (
⋂
S∈S S)⊥.
Proof. (i) If x ∈ S∩S⊥, then x⊥x, which implies x = 0.
(ii) If x, y ∈ S⊥ and a, b ∈ C, then for all s ∈ S, 〈ax+ by,s〉 = a〈x,s〉 + b〈y.s〉
= 0 + 0 = 0. Thus S⊥ is a linear manifold. Suppose that {xk} is a sequence in S⊥
that converges in norm to x ∈ H . Then for all s ∈ S, 〈x,s〉 = limk→∞〈xk,s〉 by a
fundamental Hilbert space property [10, Theor.2.21B(i)]. Since 〈xk,s〉 = 0 for all
k ∈N, we have that 〈x,s〉 = 0. So, x ∈ S⊥, which shows that S⊥ is closed.
(iii) Suppose x ∈ T⊥. For every s ∈ S we have s ∈ T , so that x⊥s. Hence,
x ∈ S⊥.
(iv) Suppose x ∈ S. If t ∈ S⊥, then x⊥t. Thus, x ∈ (S⊥)⊥.
(v) – (vi) see [10, p. 123].
Theorem 51. If H is a Hilbert space and L(H ) is the collection of all subspaces
in H , then L(H ) together with the set-inclusion ⊆ and the complementation ⊥ is
a quantum logic with 0 = {0} and 1 = H .
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Proof. If K1, K2 ∈ L(H ), then {K1, K2} has supremum K1 ∨K2 and infimum
K1∩K2. So L(H ,⊆) is a lattice. Clearly, {0} and H are, respectively, the least
and greatest members of the lattice. By Theorem 50 (i), (v) and (vi), ⊥ is a non-
contradictory negation. So there remains to establish the orthomodular identity
(35). Suppose J, K ∈ L(H ) with J ⊆ K. We wish to show that K = J ∨ (J⊥ ∩
K). Then there exist bases B and B0 for J and K, respectively, with B ⊆ B0 [10,
Theor. 4.8].
First, suppose x ∈ K. Then x = ∑b∈B0〈x,b〉b = ∑b∈B〈x,b〉b + ∑b∈B0\B〈x,b〉b.
Since B0 \B ⊆ J⊥, the second term belongs to J⊥∩K. Since the first term belongs
to J, we have that x is a linear combination of vectors in J ∪ (J⊥ ∩K), so x ∈
J∨ (J⊥∩K). This establishes that K ⊆ J∨ (J⊥∩K).
On the other hand, observe that since both J and J⊥∩K are subspaces of K, so
is the span of their join.
Example 52. Let H be a Hilbert space of dimension dimCH ≧ 2, and x, y ∈H
two nonzero orthogonal vectors in H . Denote X , Y , Z ⊂ H the one-dimensional
subspaces spanned by them, X = span({x}), Y = span({y}), and Z = span({x+
y}). In fact, X , Y , Z ∈ L(H ). Then we directly verify that X ∨Y = 1, X ∨Z = 1,
X ∧Y = 0, X ∧Z = 0, and Z∧Y = 0. Hence we have
X ∨ (Y ∧Z) = X , X ∧ (Y ∨Z) = X , (75)
and on the other hand,
(X ∨Y )∧ (X ∨Z) = 1, (X ∧Y )∨ (Y ∧Z) = 0. (76)
Thus, the distributive laws (17) and (18) are not satisfied in the logic L(H ). ♦
5.2 Quantum mechanics constructed from quantum logic
Example 53. Let H be a Hilbert space, and P: H →H a self-adjoint operator
with spectrum σP ⊂ {0,1}. Then P must be a projection, i.e., P2 = P. Projections
are in a bijective correspondence with the closed subspaces of H : if P is a projec-
tion, its range ran(P) is closed, and any closed subspace is the range of a unique
projection. If u∈H is a unit vector, then 〈Pu,u〉 = ‖Pu‖2 is the expected value of
the corresponding observable in the state represented by u. Since this is 0-1 valued,
we can interpret ‖Pu‖2 as the probability that a measurement of the observable will
produce the “affirmative” answer 1. In particular, this affirmative answer will have
probability 1 if and only if Pu = u, i.e., u ∈ ran(P).
We thus can impose on the set L(H ) of projections on H the structure of a
complete uniquely complemented lattice, defining
P≦ Q if ran(P)⊂ ran(Q), and P′ = 1−P (77)
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(such that ran(P′) = ran(P)⊥). It is straightforward that P ≦ Q just in the case
PQ = QP = P. More generally, if PQ = QP, then PQ = P∧Q; also in this case
their join is given by P∨Q = P+Q−PQ. Then, L(H ) is a quantum logic. ♦
Example 53 motivates the following. Call two projections P, Q ∈ L(H ) or-
thogonal, in symbols P⊥Q, if P ≦ Q′. It follows that P⊥Q if and only if PQ =
QP = 0. If P and Q are orthogonal projections, then their join is simply their sum,
denoted traditionally P⊕Q; in other words, P∨Q = P⊕Q if P⊥Q. We denote the
identity mapping on H by 1H .
Definition 54. A probability measure on L = L(H ) is a mapping µ : L → [0,1]
such that µ(1H ) = 1 and, for any sequence of pairwise orthogonal projections P j
∈ L, j = 1, 2, . . . ,
µ(⊕ jP j) = ∑ j µ(P j). (78)
♦
A way to construct a probability measure on L(H ) is, for any unit vector
u ∈H , to set µu(P) = 〈Pu|u〉. This gives the orthodox Copenhagen interpretation
of quantum mechanics for the probability that P will yield the value 1 if the physical
system is in the state u. Another way to express this fact is to write µu(P) =
Tr(PPu), where Pu is the projection on the one-dimensional subspace generated by
the unit vector u.
More generally, probability measures µ j, j = 1, 2, . . . , on L(H ) form a mix-
ture µ = ∑ j t jµ j where 0 ≦ t j ≦ 1 and ∑ j t j = 1 (the convex combination of the
µ j’s). Given any sequence u1, u2, . . . of unit vectors in H , let be µ j = µu j and P j
= Pu j . Then for the density operator ρ of the mixture,
ρ = t1P1 + t2P2 + . . . , (79)
we have
µ(P) = t1Tr(PP1)+ t2Tr(PP2)+ . . .= Tr(ρP). (80)
Therefore, every density operator ρ gives rise to a probability measure µ on L(H ).
The remarkable theorem of Gleason shows the converse, i.e., that to every proba-
bility measure there exists a density operator ρ .
Theorem 55 (Gleason (1957)). Let H be a separable Hilbert space with dimen-
sion dimCH ≧ 3. Then every probability measure on the space L(H ) of projec-
tions has the form µ(P) = tr(ρP) for a density operator ρ on H .
An important direct consequence of Gleason’s Theorem is that L(H ) does not
permit any probability measures having only the values 0 and 1. To see this, note
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that for any density operator W , the mapping u 7→ 〈Wu|u〉 is continuous on the unit
sphere of H . But since it is connected, no continuous function on it can take only
the discrete values 0 and 1. Thus this result rules out the the possibility of “hidden
variables,” an issue which had been subject of a long debate and was decided in the
experiments of Aspect in the early 1980’s [3].
From the single premise that the “experimental propositions” associated with a
physical system are encoded by projections as in Example 53, one can reconstruct
the formal apparatus of quantum mechanics. The first step is Gleason’s Theorem,
which tells us that probability measures on the quantum logic L(H ) correspond
to density operators. With the fundamental “spectral theorem” of functional anal-
ysis, stating that to every observable there exists a certain family of projection
operators, the observables are derivable by quantum logic. Even the dynamics of
quantum mechanics, i.e., the unitary evolution, can be deduced with the aid of a
deep theorem of Wigner on the projective representations of groups. For details
see [42].
5.3 Compatible propositions
Definition 56. Two propositions x and y in a quantum logic L are called orthogo-
nal, symbolically x⊥y, if the relations
x∧ y = 0, x≦ y′, y≦ x′, (81)
are satisfied. Two propositions x, y ∈ L are called compatible, or comeasurable, if
there exist u, v, w ∈ L such that
(i) u, v, w are pairwise orthogonal;
(ii) u∨ v = x and v∨w = y;
(iii) The sublattice B formed by {u,v,w,x,y,u′ ,v′,w′,x′,y′} is orthomodular, i.e.,
each pair of propositions in B satisfy (35).
We then call {u, v, w} a compatible decomposition for x and y. ♦
By (27) two propositions x, y with the compatible decomposition {u,v,w} sat-
isfy
x′ = u′∧ v′ ≧ w, y′ = v′∧w′ ≧ u, x∨ y = u∨ v∨w. (82)
Clearly, two orthogonal propositions x, y ∈ L of a logic are always compatible,
since we may simply identify u = x, v = 0, and w = y. The notion “orthogo-
nal” originally refers to the geometrical relationship between two propositions of
a quantum logic, which are subspaces of a Hilbert space. Figure 13 depicts three
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0
Figure 13: Compatible decompositions {u,v,w} for x and y: (a) F2 = 22 for x⊥y,
i.e., v = 0, w = x, u = y; (b) 23 for v 6= 0, w′ = x, u′ = y; (c) for v 6= 0, w′ 6= x, u′ 6= y.
compatible decompositions. They are distributive, (a) and (b) are Boolean and (c)
is a sublattice of the Boolean lattice 24.
Theorem 57. Let L be a quantum logic. If {u, v, w} is a compatible decomposition
for x and y in L, then
u = x∧ y′, (83)
w = x′∧ y, (84)
v = x∧ y = (x′∨ y)∧ x = (x∨ y′)∧ y. (85)
Therefore, u, v, and w are uniquely determined by x and y.
Proof. By Theorem 28 and Theorem 22, in a quantum logic De Morgan’s laws
(27) and (33) hold.
Proof of (83): Since by definition we have u ≦ w′ and u ≦ v′, we have u ≦
v′ ∧w′ = (v∨w)′ = y′, where the first equality follows from (33). But also u ≦ x
(by definition), so
u≦ x∧ y′. (86)
Now x∧ y′ ≦ y′, thus u≦ y′, implying that y≦ u′, so by the orthomodular identity
(35), u′ = y∨ (y′∧u′), or by (33) u = y′∧ (y∨u). Now y∨u = y∨ x. Now if r ≦ x
and r ≦ y′, then r ≦ y′ ∧ x ≦ y′ ∧ (y∨ x) = u. This together with (86) establishes
that u = inf{x,y′}= x∧ y′.
Proof of (84): This is proved with an argument analogous to (83).
Proof of (85): First observe that w, u ≦ v′, so w∨ u ≦ v′. By (35) thus v′ =
w∨ u∨ ((w∨ u)′∧ v′), so that v = (w∨ u)′ ∧ (w∨ u∨ v) = ((x′ ∧ y) ∨ (x∧ y′)) ∧
(x∨ y) = ((x∨ y′) ∧ (x′ ∨ y)) ∧ (x∨ y). Now v ≦ x, y, and we shall immediately
establish that v = inf{x,y} = x∧ y. Let r ≦ x, y. Then r ≦ ((x∨ y′) ∧ (x′ ∨ y))
∧ (x∨ y) = v. This establishes the first equality in (85). For the second equality,
observe that u≦ v′ so that by the orthomodular identity (35), v′ = u∨ (u′∧ v′), or v
= u′∧ (u∨ v) = (x′∨ y)∧ x. The third equality is proved similarly.
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Theorem 58. Let L be a quantum logic. Then two propositions x and y ∈ L are
compatible if and only if
x = (x∧ y)∨ (x∧ y′) (87)
and
y = (y∧ x)∨ (y∧ x′). (88)
Proof. Since x∧ y ≦ x and x∧ y′ ≦ x, we deduce (x∧ y) ∨ (x∧ y′) ≦ x, whether
or not x and y are compatible. The reverse inequality follows from Theorem 57;
for if {u, v, w} is a compatibility decomposition for x and y, then x∧ y = v, x∧
y′ = u, and u∨ v = x. This yields (87). Similarly, (88) follows by an analogous
argument. Conversely, if (87) and (88) hold, we have that {x∧ y′, x∧ y, x′ ∧ y′}
form a compatibility decomposition of x and y.
In [32] propositions satisfying (87) and (88) are called “commensurable”, in
[10] “commuting.” These conditions reveal the intuitive meaning of the orthomod-
ularity condition: comparable elements are compatible. Notice that by the first
distributive inequality (15), with z = y′, we have always x≧ (x∧ y)∨ (x∧ y′). The-
orem 58 then states that we generally do not have the reverse x ≦ (x∧ y)∨ (x∧ y′)
unless x and y are compatible. Thus, if x and y are not compatible, then knowing
that proposition x is true is not sufficient for concluding that at least one of the
following ist true:
(i) x and y are simultaneously true (i.e., u is true), or
(ii) x and “not-y” are simultaneously true (i.e., v is true).
This logical structure captures the idea of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle that
for some physical systems there might exist a pair of propositions whose truth
values simply cannot be simultaneously determined. The algebraic structure which
guarantees compatibility is the distributivity.
5.4 The logic of quantum registers
5.4.1 The Boolean logic of a single qubit
A two-state quantum system, such as a spin-12 particle, is described by the two-di-
mensional Hilbert space H = C2. Consider measurements of the spin-component
along a particular direction, say along the z-axis (any direction will do as well).
This can be operationalized by a Stern-Gerlach type experiment [24] using an inho-
mogeneous magnetic field. There are two possible spin components of the particle,
namely spin − 12 h¯ and + 12 h¯; we will shortly say that the particle is in state “+” or
|0〉 if it has spin + 12 h¯, and in state “−” or |1〉 if it has spin − 12 h¯. This corresponds
to the following propositions.
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1
p− p+
0
Figure 14: The Boolean lattice MO1 ≃ 22 of a single qubit, with the (orthogonal)
states p− and p+. (Cf. Figs. 3)
p−: “The particle is in state ‘−’ ” = 1-dimensional subspace span{|1〉}
p+: “The particle is in state ‘+’ ” = 1-dimensional subspace span{|0〉}
1: “The particle is in some state” = whole space H = C2
0: “The particle is in no state” = zero-dimensional subspace {(0,0)}
The proposition 1 is the tautology, 0 is the absurd statement. The propositions p−
and p+ are the atoms. Since they are complements of each other, i.e., p+ = (p−)′
and p− = (p+)′, they form a Boolean logic (Figure 14).
5.4.2 Quantum register of size n
A quantum register of size n is a physical system of n qubits. Mathematically, it is
a composition of several single systems (a ‘tensor product’). A general lattice rep-
resenting such a composition seems to be impossible [41, p. 51], but for the special
case of a a composite system without entanglement, for instance a measurement of
a single qubit of a quantum register, a lattice is given as follows. According to the
“pasting construction” [41, §3.2] each qubit is considered as a Boolean “block,”
and identical propositions in different blocks are identified such that the logical
structure in each block remains intact. This yields the lattice MOn (for “modular
orthocomplemented”) in Fig. 15, consisting of 2n atoms p±n satisfying
p+j = (p
−
j )
′, p−j = (p
+
j )
′ for j = 1,2, . . . ,n. (89)
Formally, MOn =
⊕n
j=1 L j with L j = {0, p+j , p−j ,1} where 0 and 1 in each L j are
identified. Therefore, p+j ∧ p−j = 0, and p+j ∨ p−j = 1. For n > 1, the lattices MOn
are not distributive, since for j 6= k, with j, k = 1, . . . , n, we have p+j ∨(p+k ∧ p−k ) =
p+j ∨0 = p+j , but (p+j ∨ p+k )∧ (p+j ∨ p−k ) = 1∧1 = 1.
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Figure 15: The modular lattice MOn of a quantum register of n qubits, if only
single-qubit measurements are considered.
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Figure 16: The Boolean lattice 24 of a quantum register of 2 qubits, if entire register
measurements are considered.
5.4.3 Entire register measurements without entanglement
In case of a measurement of the entire quantum register of size n, the atoms are
given by the four propositions p00, p01, p10, and p11, where pi j corresponds to
the basis vector |i j〉 of the four-dimensional Hilbert space H = C4. They are
composed to the following propositions:
u = p00∨ p01, v = p00∨ p10, w = p00∨ p11,
x = p01∨ p10, y = p01∨ p11, z = p10∨ p11, (90)
This yields the Boolean lattice 24, cf. Fig. 16 and [41, §5.2].
6 Paraconsistent logics and effect structures
The (orthodox) quantum logic based on the proposals of Birhhoff and von Neu-
mann as described above, is both a “total” and a “sharp” logic. A logic is total if
the set of “meaningful propositions” is closed under the basic logical operations,
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i.e., the conjunction as well as the disjunction of two meaningful propositions is
again a meaningful proposition. A logic is sharp if each proposition corresponds
to exact physical properties of the corresponding physical system.
There has been deep criticism in different contexts on both the total and the
sharp character of quantum logic. One main objection to orthodox quantum logic,
for instance, has been that by the identification of propositions with the projections
of the Hilbert space given the quantum system, propositions in fact are identified
with the physical properties of the system. This one-to-one correspondence im-
plies the identification of the extensional notion of a proposition (according to the
standard tradition of semantics) with the collapse of the empirical and intensional
concepts of “experimental proposition,” “physical property.” Although quite con-
venient mathematically, this collapse has been called a “metaphysical disaster”
[37]. It stimulated the investigation about more and more general quantum struc-
tures which, however, do not yield lattice structures in a direct way. The main goal
is to find some algebraic structure on the semantic level and to derive a quantum
logic.
An important extension of the mathematical representation is the notion of an
“effect” as a representative of an experimental proposition [15, 17]. The main idea
is to define a quantum physical observable operationally in terms of an experimen-
tal procedure or a class of them, and the ensuing measurement statistics are to be
described by probability measures depending on the input states. In this way, any
observable is a normalized positive-operator-valued measure (POVM) A, assign-
ing to each measurement outcome x or outcome range X (Borel set, usually a real
set) its measurement probability A({x}) or A(X). If the measurement outcomes
are finite, e.g., {x1, . . . , xn}, it is custom to write the POVM as the set {A1, . . . ,
An} such that 〈ψ |A j|ψ〉 yields the probability to measure the state |ψ〉. Neces-
sarily, 0 ≦ 〈ψ |A j|ψ〉 ≦ 1, and ∑ j A j = I. In terms of density operator, we have
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ |, and tr (Aρ) = 〈ψ |A|ψ〉. [33, §2.2.6] Any such operator A is an effect.
Definition 59. Let H be a given Hilbert space describing a quantum system. Then
the set E(H ) of all effects of H is defined as the set of all linear bounded self-
adjoint operators A on H such that tr(Aρ)∈ [0,1] for an arbitrary density operator
ρ . ♦
An effect A is a projection if and only if A2 = A, that is, projections are exactly
the idempotent effects. An important difference between effects and projections is
that effects may represent fuzzy propositions like “the value for the observable A
lies in the fuzzy Borel set µA.” In particular, there exists effects A different from
the null projection O such that no state ρ can verify A with probability 1, i.e.,
tr (Aρ) < 1 for all statistical operators ρ . A limiting case is the semitransparent
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effect 12 I, to which any statistical operator ρ assigns the probability 12 . It represents
the prototypical ambiguity.
The set E(H ) of effects can be naturally structured as a poset (E(H ),⊑)
with minimal bound O and maximal bound I where A ⊑ B means by definition
that tr (Aρ) ≦ tr (Bρ) for any statistical operator ρ . It is easily checked that the
null projection O and the identity I are minimum and maximum, respectively, with
respect to ⊑. However, (E(H ),⊑) is not a lattice. Contrary to projections, there
exist pairs of effects which have no uniquely defined infimum or supremum.
Example 60. Consider the following effects on the Hilbert space H = C2, given
in matrix-representation:
A =
( 1
2 0
0 12
)
, B =
( 3
4 0
0 14
)
, C =
( 1
2 0
0 14
)
, D =
( 7
16
1
8
1
8
3
16
)
.
Then C ⊑ A, B, as well as D ⊑ A, B. However, C 6⊑ D and D 6⊑C, i.e., there does
not exist an infimum of A and B. ♦
A possibility to obtain a lattice structure from (E(H ),⊑) is to embed it into
its Mac Neille completion.
Definition 61. Let (B,⊑) be a poset with universal bounds O and I and an in-
volution ′ satisfying (i) A = A′′ and (ii) A ⊑ B ⇒ B′ ⊑ A′. Then the Mac Neille
completion is defined as the tuple (MC(B),⊆,′ ,{0},B) where
MC(B) = {X ⊆B : X = u(l(X))} (91)
with l(X) and u(X) denoting all lower bounds and all upper bounds of X , respec-
tively, and
X ′ := {A ∈B : A⊑ B′ ∀B ∈ X}. (92)
♦
It turns out that X ∈MC(B) if and only if X = X ′′. Moreover, MC(B) is uni-
versally bounded lattice where X ⊓Y = X ∩Y and X ⊔Y = (X ∪Y )′′. The negation
is fuzzy and does not satisfy neither the non-contradiction law nor the tertium non
datur [14].
Another common possibility to derive a logic structure from effects is provided
by the fact that effects naturally form an algebra (“effect algebra”) [17] which is
equivalent to a quasilinear QMV algebra [14]. In this approach, the operator
A⊕B =
{
A+B if A+B ∈ E(H ),
I otherwise, (93)
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and the negation
A′ = I−A (94)
are introduced. The semitransparent effect 12 I is a fixed point of the negation, i.e.,
it is its own negation. Moreover, 12 I⊕ 12 I = I.
6.1 Paraconsistent quantum logics (PQL)
Example 62. (The lattices G6, G8, G14) Among the simplest finite paraconsistent
logics are the the lattices G6, G8, and G14 depicted in Figure 17. They are not
1
x′
y y′
x
0
1
f ′
y x′
x y′
f
0
1
f ′
a′ b′ c′ d′ e′
a b c d e
f
0
Figure 17: The paraconsistent quantum logics G6, G8, and G14.
orthomodular, in G6 and G8, for instance, x∨ (x′ ∧ y) = x 6= y although x < y.
However, they satisfy (34) since the premise of (34) is satisfied only if both x and
y are either 0 or 1. The lattice G14 is given in [14]. ♦
Theorem 63. Orthomodularity implies paraconsistency, but not vice versa.
Proof. By orthomodularity (35) we have y = x∨ (x′ ∧ y) for x≦ y, implying x = y
if additionally x′∧ y = 0. A paraconsistent logic which is not a quantum logic, on
the other hand, is G6, cf. Example 62.
In other words: A quantum logic is always paraconsistent, but there exist para-
consistent logics which are not quantum logics.
Theorem 64. A non-contradictory logic is not necessarily paraconsistent.
Proof. A non-contradictory logic which is not paraconsistent is O6 with x∨ y = 1
in Figure 7, since x 6= y although x≦ y and x′∧ y = 0.
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The Mac Neille completion of the effect poset E(H ) is a paraconsistent logic.
Paraconsistent quantum logic is the most obvious fuzzy weakening of quantum
logic [14]. From the physical point of view, propositions in PQL (possible worlds)
represent pieces of information about the physical system under investigation. Any
information may be either maximal (a pure state) or non-maximal (a mixed state),
either sharp (a projection) or fuzzy (a proper effect). Violations of the non-contra-
diction law are caused by fuzzy (ambiguous) pieces of knowledge.
Another important property of the paraconsistent quantum logic is that it is
a sublogic of a wide class of logics, such as Girard’s linear logic, Łukasiewicz
infinite many-valued logic LR and some relevant logics [14].
7 Implicative lattices and intuitionistic logic
Roughly speaking, “intuitionism” holds that logic and mathematics are “construc-
tive” mental activities, i.e., theorems are not discovered, but invented. Thus, logic
and mathematics are the application of internally consistent methods to realize
more complex mental constructs. Intuitionistic logic is the logic used in mathe-
matical constructivism, introduced by Brouwer and Heyting.
In classical logic, a formula, say P, asserts that P is true. In intuitionistic logic a
formula is only considered to be true if it can be proved. Intuitionistic logic substi-
tutes “provability” for “truth” in its logical calculus. The logical calculus preserves
provability, rather than truth, across transformations yielding derived propositions.
The essential difference to propositional logic is the interpretation of negation.
In propositional logic, ¬P asserts that P is false; in intuitionistic logic, ¬P asserts
that a proof of P is impossible. The asymmetry is apparent: If P is provable, then
it is certainly impossible to prove that there is no proof of P; however, we cannot
conclude that there is a proof of P, only from an absence of a proof for a proof of
the impossibility of P.
A direct consequence is that many tautologies can no longer be proved within
intuitionistic logic. An example is the tertium non datur (Theorem 23, Exam-
ple 24). In intuitionistic logic, P∨¬P = 1 says that at least one of P or ¬P can
be proved, which is stronger than saying that their disjunction is true. Similarly,
Peirce’s Law ((P→ Q)→ P)→ P = 1 does not hold in intuitionistic logic.
From a practical point of view, there is a strong motivation for using intuition-
istic logic. Solving problems in computer science, one obviously is not interested
in mere statements of existence. A computer program is assumed to compute an
answer, not to state that there is one. In applications one usually looks for a “wit-
ness” for a given existence assertion. In addition, one may have concerns about a
proof system which has a proof for ∃x : P(x), but which fails to prove P(b) for any
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concrete b it considers.
The observation that many classically valid tautologies are not theorems of
intuitionistic logic leads to the idea of weakening the proof theory of classical
logic. This has for example been done by Gentzen with his “sequent calculus
LK,” obtaining a weaker version that he called LJ [12, §6.A], [38, §6]. A model
theory can be given by Heyting algebras or, equivalently, by Kripke semantics,
developed in the 1950’s and 1960’s. The most natural mathematical framework for
intuitionistic logic is the algebraic concept of an implicative lattice, i.e., a lattice
which is relatively pseudocomplemented and turns out to be distributive.
7.1 Implicative lattices
In connection with the foundations of logic, Brouwer and Heyting characterized
an important generalization of Boolean algebra, motivated by the following con-
sideration. In a Boolean algebra A, the complement a′ of an element a ∈ A is
the greatest element x such that a∧ x = 0, i.e., such that a and x are “disjoint”;
more generally, a∧ x ≦ b if and only if a∧ x∧ b′ = 0, that is (a∧ b′)∧ x = 0 or
x ≦ (a∧ b′)′ = b∨ a′ = a → b. Hence, given a, b ∈ A, there exists a greatest ele-
ment c such that a∧ c≦ b.
Definition 65. A lattice L is called implicative, or Brouwerian, if for any a, b ∈
L the set {x ∈ L : a∧ x ≦ b} contains a greatest element, the residuum, relative
pseudo-complement or material implication a → b of a in b. In a Brouwerian
lattice with a universal bound O, the element a→ O is called a pseudocomplement
of a. ♦
Therefore, in an implicative lattice we have:
a∧ (a→ b)≦ b (“modus ponens”), (95)
a∧ c≦ b⇐⇒ c≦ a→ b, (“residuation”), (96)
for any a, b, c ∈ L.1 The material implication can be considered as an operation
→: L2 → L.
Lemma 66. Let L be an implicative lattice. Then the operation →: L2 → L is
inversely monotone with respect to its left argument and directly monotone with
respect to its right argument. Further the following relations hold for all a, b,
c ∈ L:
b≦ a→ b, (97)
1The modus ponens follows directly from the definition of a → b, as well as the ⇒-direction of
(96); the ⇐-direction of (96) follows immediately by modus ponens.
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a→ (b→ c) = (a∧b)→ c = b→ (a→ c), (98)
a→ (b→ c)≦ (a→ b)→ (a→ c), (99)
a→ (b∧ c) = (a→ b)∧ (a→ c), (100)
a→ (a→ b) = a→ b. (101)
Eq. (101) is called law of contraction. If L has a universal upper bound 1, then
a = 1→ a, (102)
a≦ b if and only if 1≦ a→ b. (103)
If L has a universal lower bound 0, then with the negation ¬a := a→ 0 we have
¬a∨b≦ a→ b, (¬a∨a)∧ (a→ b)≦ ¬a∨b. (104)
Proof. Assume a≦ b. Then a∧ (b→ c)≦ b∧ (b→ c)≦ c by (8) and (95), hence
b → c ≦ a→ c by (96), proving the left monotonicity. Analogously, for a≦ b the
right monotony follows from c∧ (c→ a)≦ a∧b by (95), hence c→ a≦ c→ b by
(96).
Proof of (97): By definition (4), we have a∧b≦ b, hence b≦ a→ b by (96).
Proof of (98): By (95), a∧ (a→ (b→ c))≦ b→ c, hence
(a∧b)∧ (a→ (b→ c))≦ b∧ (b→ c)≦ c
again by (95) and the monotony. Then a → (b → c) ≦ (a∧ b)→ c by (96). This
proves the left equation. The right equation follows by interchanging a and b and
using the commutativity law (10) and the monotony.
Proof of (99): We have
a∧ (a→ b)∧ (a→ (b→ c)) ≦ a∧ (a→ b)∧a∧ (a→ (b→ c))
≦ b∧ (b→ c)
≦ c.
Here the first inequality follows by (9), (10), the second one follows by (95) and
monotony, and the last one by (95). Hence (a → b)∧ (a → (b → c)) ≦ a → c by
(96), and a→ (b→ c)≦ (a→ b)∧ (a→ c) by (96).
Proof of (100): We have a → (b∧ c) ≦ a → b by (4) and monotony, and also
a→ (b∧ c)≦ a→ c. Hence a→ (b∧ c)≦ (a→ b)∧ (a→ c) by (13). Conversely,
a∧(a→ b)∧(a→ c)≦ b∧c by (95) as in the proof for (99). Hence (a→ b)∧(a→
c)≦ b∧ c by (96).
Proof of (101): This is the first equation in (98) with a = b.
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Proof of (102): By (97) we have a≦ 1→ a, and conversely 1→ a = 1∧ (1→
a), since by definition of the universal bound, 1∧ x = x. Thus, a≦ 1→ a≦ a.
Proof of (103): Suppose a ≦ b. Then 1∧ a ≦ b and 1 ≦ a → b by (96). Con-
versely, assume 1≦ a→ b. Then a = a∧1≦ b by (95).
Theorem 67. Any implicative lattice is distributive and a relative pseudo-comple-
ment in it is unique.
Proof. Given a, b, c ∈ L, form d = (a∧ b)∨ (a∧ c) and consider a → d. Since
a∧ b ≦ d, we have b ≦ a → d and c ≦ a → d. Hence b∧ c ≦ a → d, and so
a∧ (b∨ c)≦ a∧ (a→ d)≦ d = (a∧b)∨ (a∧ c). But this implies distributivity, by
the distributive inequality (15) and Theorem 11. Assume that x and y are relative
pseudocomplements of a in b. Then x∧ a = y∧ a ≦ b, since both are the greatest
elements, hence by Theorem 12, x = y.
Corollary 68. An implicative lattice with universal bounds 0 and 1 is a distributive
logic with the unique negation ¬a := a′ = a→ 0 for a ∈ L.
Proof. Let L be an implicative lattice. With Theorem 67, L is distributive and has
a unique pseudocomplement of a relative to b for all a, b ∈ L. In particular, a′
is unique, and by the definition of material implication we have 0′ = 0 → 0 = 1.
Thus,
a→ (a′)′ = a→ (a′→ 0) = (a∧a′)→ 0 = 0→ 0 = 1, (105)
where the second equality follows from (98). With (103) we thus have a ≦ (a′)′.
Moreover, for all a, b, c ∈ L we have the relation
(a∨b)→ c = (a→ c)∧ (b→ c), (106)
since on the one hand, (a∨b)→ c ≦ a → c by the antitony, and analogously (a∨
b)≦ b→ c, i.e., (a∨b)≦ (a→ c)∧(b→ c), and on the other hand by distributivity,
(a∨b)∧ (a→ c)∧ (b→ c)
= a∧ (a→ c)∧ (b→ c)∨b∧ (a→ c)∧ (b→ c)
≦ (c∧ (b→ c))∨ (c∧ (a→ c)) (by (95)
= c∧ ((b→ c)∨ (a→ c))≦ c,
thus (a→ c)∧(b→ c)≦ (a∨b)→ c by (96). By (106) for c = 0 we have (a∨b)′ =
(a → b)→ c = (a → c)∧ (b → c) = a′ ∧ b′, i.e., the disjunctive De Morgan law
(27). Hence L is a logic.
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Theorem 69. In an implicative lattice L with universal bounds 0 and 1 and the
pseudocomplement defined by ¬a := a′ = a→ 0, the following relations are equiv-
alent for all a, b ∈ L.
(Strong double negation, stability law) a = ¬¬a (107)
(tertium non datur) 1 = a∨¬a, (108)
(Peirce’s law) a = (a→ b)→ a, (109)
1 = a∨ (a→ b). (110)
Proof. (107) ⇒ (108): Since L is a logic, this follows by Theorem 23.
(108) ⇒ (107): By the distributivity law and (23) it follows
¬¬a = ¬¬a∧ (a∨¬a) = (¬¬a∧a)∨ (¬¬a∧¬a) = a∨0 = a.
(108) ⇒ (109): By (97) we have (a→ b)→ a≦ ¬a→ ((a → b)→ a), i.e, by
(98) and (100)
(a→ b)→ a≦ (¬a∧ (a→ b))→ a = ((a→ 0)∧ (a→ b))→ a = ¬a→ a,
hence by (97)
a≦ (a→ b)→ a≦ ¬a→ a. (111)
Since by (108) we deduce from (104) that a → b = ¬a∨ b, we have ¬a → a = a,
and by (111) we have (109).
(109) ⇒ (110): First we see that
((a∨ (a→ b))→ a)→ (a∨ (a→ b)) = a∨ (a→ b) (112)
by Peirce’s law (109). Moreover, by (97) we have a ≦ (a∨ (a → b))→ a, but by
the antitony of→ with respect to its left argument, (a∨(a→ b))→ a≦ (a→ b)→
a = a, applying Peirce’s law again, hence (a∨ (a → b))→ a = a, and insertion in
(112) yields
a→ (a∨ (a→ b)) = a∨ (a→ b). (113)
By (103) we therefore have 1≦ a→ a = a→ (a∨ (a→ b)) = a∨ (a→ b).
(110) ⇒ (108): Set b = 0 in (110).
It is easily verified that any Boolean algebra is an implicative lattice, in which
a → b = a′ ∨ b is the relative complement of a in [a∧ b,1]. Likewise, any finite
distributive lattice is implicative, since the join u =∨x j of the x j such that a∧x j ≦
b satisfies a∧u= a∧∨x j =∨(a∧x j)≦ b. In [12, §4C], implicative lattices and the
dual “subtractive” lattices are summarized under the notion “Skolem lattice”. Since
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analogously to the implicative case, every finite distributive lattice is subtractive,
we conclude that any finite distributive lattice is a Skolem lattice.
The simplest non-Boolean implicative lattice is the Go¨del logic G3 given in
Example 37.
Example 70. (Heyting algebra of open sets of R2) Let O(R2,⊆) be the poset
of open sets of the plane R2, and let ∧ and ∨ denote the operations correspond
to set intersection and union, respectively. Then A → B = (AC)◦ ∪B is the union
of the set B and the inner set (AC)◦ of the complement AC = R2 \A of the set A.
Therefore, O(R2,⊆) is a lattice, with universal bounds 0 = /0 and 1 =R2. With the
pseudocomplement ¬A := (AC)◦ as negation, (O(R2,⊆),¬) is even a distributive
logic. Especially, the formula A∧¬A = 0 is valid, since A∩ (AC)◦ = /0. However,
tertium non datur is not valid, as is seen by letting A = {(x,y) : y > 0} be the upper
half plane: ¬A = {(x,y) : y ≦ 0}◦ = {(x,y) : y < 0}, and A∨¬A = {(x,y) ∈ R2 :
y 6= 0} 6= R2, i.e., A∨¬A < 1. ♦
In general, the complete distributive lattice of all open subsets of any topolog-
ical space is implicative. However, the complete distributive lattice of all closed
subsets of the line is not implicative: there is no greatest closed set satisfying
p∧ x = /0. Therefore, not all distributive lattices are implicative, distributivity is
necessary but not sufficient for a lattice to be implicative. Nondistributive logics
like quantum logics thus are not implicative lattices.
Theorem 71 (Curry’s Paradox [11]). Let L be an implicative lattice with a uni-
versal upper bound 1 ∈ L, and let y ∈ L be an arbitrary proposition. Suppose
moreover that the mapping fy : L→ L,
fy(x) = (x→ y) (114)
has a fixed point x∗ ∈ L, i.e., that there exists a proposition x∗ ∈ L such that x∗ =
fy(x∗). Then both x∗ and y are true, i.e., x∗ = y = 1.
Proof. First we notice that by the residuation condition (96) we have 1=(x∗→ x∗),
setting a = b = x∗ and c = 1. Since x∗ is a fixed point, we have x∗→ fy(x∗), hence
1 = x∗→ (x∗→ y) (99)= (x∗∧ x∗)→ y = x∗→ y. (115)
Thus fy(x∗) = 1, i.e., x∗ = fy(x∗) = 1. By modus ponens (95), with a= 1 and b= y,
this implies 1≦ y.
A paradox arises in an implicative lattice with a universal lower bound 0 since
y can be any proposition, especially a false proposition. A natural language version
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of Curry’s paradox reads “If this sentence is true, then Santa Claus exists.” Here x
= “this sentence is true” and y = “Santa Claus exists,” and thus y is true. However,
in the version above the paradox is resolved since it is formulated completely on
the object language level:
Corollary 72. In an implicative lattice with universal upper bound 1, the mapping
fy for y < 1 in Eq. (114) has no fixed point.
Curry’s paradox is a serious challenge in naive truth theory with an unrestricted
T -schema T [x]↔ x. In a similar fashion as Theorem 71 it then can be proved that
any sentence y can be derived from this schema. In natural language, T [x] = “This
sentence x is derivable,” and T [x]↔ x. Concerning provability instead of truth, the
paradox is known as Lo¨b’s Theorem [8, §18].
8 Boolean algebras
A complemented distributive lattice is called Boolean lattice, or Boolean algebra.
In a Boolean algebra L, the notation is usually modified. The complement x′ is
replaced by ¬x and called negation. The universal bounds are denoted simply by 0
and 1.
The fact that it can be regarded as an algebra is justified by the first part of fol-
lowing statement which asserts that in a Boolean lattice complements are unique.
Theorem 73. In a Boolean lattice L each element x ∈ L has one and only one
complement, and the complementation is an involutive negation, i.e.,
(x′)′ = x. (116)
Proof. Assume that for an element x ∈ L in the lattice there exist two complements
x′, y. Then we have x∧ x′ = x∧ y = O, and x∨ x′ = x∨ y = I. With Theorem
12 this implies x′ = y. Therefore, x 7→ x′ is single-valued. But by the symmetry
of the definition 16 of complement, x is a complement of x′, hence x = (x′)′ by
uniqueness, proving (116). Thus the correspondence x 7→ x′ is one-one.
By the definition 16 of complement, we have x = x∧ I = x∧ (y∨ y′), i.e., in a
Boolean algebra by the distributive law
x = (x∧ y)∨ (x∧ y′) for all x,y ∈ L. (117)
In a Boolean algebra there can be defined the addition ⊕ (i.e., addition modulo 2)
and multiplication · by
x · y := x∧ y, x⊕ y := (x∧ y′)∨ (x′∧ y) (118)
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Then the ∨-operation and the negation are related to the addition by
x∨ y = x⊕ y⊕ xy, x′ = 1⊕ x, (119)
where we assign O by 0 and I by 1. With multiplication and addition defined in
this way, the Boolean algebra is a “Boolean ring with unit.”
Theorem 74. Any complete atomic Boolean lattice is isomorphic to 2ℵ, where ℵ
is the cardinality of the set of its atoms.
Proof. [5, §VIII.9].
Theorem 75. A necessary and sufficient condition that x = y hold in a Boolean
algebra is that x and y have the same value in every evaluation of 0-1 truth tables.
Analogously, a necessary and sufficient condition for x ≦ y is that y has the value
1 in every evaluation of 0-1 tables in which x has the value 1.
Proof. [12, Theorem 6 in §6.D].
For a Boolean algebra, this theorem gives a theoretical solution to the decision
problem whether a given “well-formed expression” x is provable. However, it is
not always the fastest method. If the number of indeterminates is n, then there are
2n possibilities to be considered. The method of reduction by translating into a
Boolean ring with unit, multiplying out, and using addition modulo 2 is faster.
8.1 Propositional logic
Boolean algebra especially applies to propositions. Thus, for any two propositions
x and y, one can denote the propositions “x and y,” “x or y,” and “not x” by x∧ y,
x∨ y, and x′, respectively. With respect to this interpretation we conclude: Propo-
sitions form a Boolean algebra (“Boole’s third law”). Hence propositional logic
is a Boolean logic. In addition to the properties of a Boolean algebra as discussed
above, in classical, “two-valued”, logic, all propositions are either true or false, and
never both. Moreover, x∧ y is true if and only if x and y are both true; x∨ y is true
when x or y is true; of x and x′, one is true and the other false.
Under these assumptions, the compound proposition “x implies y” (i.e., “if x
then y”), denoted x → y, has a special meaning. It is true or false according to “y
or not-x” is true or false. Hence one can interpret x→ y meaning x′∨ y, i.e.,
x≦ y = x′∨ y. (120)
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In two-valued logics, one can similarly symbolize the statement “x is equivalent to
y” by x↔ y, and replace it by “x implies y and y implies x,” i.e., with the symmetric
addition operation of complemented Boolean ring:
x↔ y = (x′∨ y)∨ (x∧ y′) = (x⊕ y)′. (121)
Many compound propositions x are “tautologies”, that is, true by virtue of their
logical structure alone. This amounts algebraically to saying that x → 1. The
simplest tautology is x∨x′ (“x or not x”). It is a simple exercise in Boolean algebra
to show that the following propositions are all tautologies of two-valued logic [5,
§XII.2]:
x∨ x′, 0→ x, x→ 1, x→ x, x↔ x, x→ (y→ x),
(x ↔ y)↔ (y↔ x), (x↔ 0)∨ (x↔ 1), (x↔ y)∨ (y→ x). (122)
Critique. There often has been raised intuitive objections to the preceding logical
rules, pushed to extremes. For instance, the tautology 0 → x asserts that “a false
proposition implies every proposition” (“ex falso quodlibet”). But what does this
really mean2? Likewise, one may question the validity of the tautology (x → y)∨
(y→ x), which asserts that “of any two propositions x and y, either x implies y or y
implies x.”
Most important, intuition can make one skeptical of the validity of “proofs by
contradiction,” or “reductio ad absurdum,” on which many mathematical proofs
are based upon. The idea of this principle is simple. Since (x → y) = x′ ∨ y, and
(y′→ x′) = y∨ x′, by the symmetry of the ∨-operation we have
(x→ y) = (y′→ x′), (123)
i.e., “x implies y” is the same as “not-y implies not-x.” So if one does not succeed in
proving the left hand side of this equation, one can try to prove the right hand side
(which is often simpler, since it is not constructive). But why should the disproof
“not-x” imply the truth of x? See Example 24.
However, propositional logic is “complete,” i.e., in propositional logic any
Boolean formula φ is derivable from a set ∆ of Boolean formulas, if and only
if, for any variable assignment, φ is true whenever each formula in ∆ is true, in
symbols ∆ ⊢ φ if and only if ∆ |= φ [27, §1.9].
2Bertrand Russell is reputed to have been challenged to prove that the false hypothesis 2+2 = 5
implied that he was the Pope. Russell replied: “You admit 2+ 2 = 5; but I can prove 2+ 2 = 4;
therefore 5 = 4. Taking two away from both sides, we have 3 = 2; taking one more, 2 = 1. But you
will admit that I and the Pope are two. Therefore, I and the Pope are one. Q.E.D.”
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8.2 First-order logic
First-order logic, sometimes also called predicate logic, is an extension of propo-
sitional logic containing the universal quantifier ∀ (“for all”) and the existential
quantifier ∃ (“there exists”).
The basis of first-order logic is given by a term which is recursively defined by
the following rules:
1. Any constant symbol a, b, c, . . . is a term with no free variables.
2. Any variable x, y, z, . . . is a term whose only free variable is itself.
3. Any expression f (t1, . . . , tn) of n≧ 1 arguments is a term, where each argu-
ment ti is a term and f is a function symbol of arity n, whose free variables
are the free variables of any of the terms ti.
A relation, or predicate variable, is then an n-ary relation S= S(t1, . . . , tn) of terms.
A relation P(t1, . . . , tn) then forms an atomic formula. If in addition it contains no
free variable it is an atomic sentence. Atomic sentences play the role of the basic
propositions of the first-order logic. Its vocabulary Σ then is the set of relations,
functions, and constant symbols.
Example 76. The vocabulary of ordered abelian groups has a constant 0, a unary
function −, a binary function +, and two binary relations = and ≦, so Σ = {0, −,
+, =, ≦}, and
• 0, x, y are atomic terms;
• +(x,y), +(x,+(y,−(z))) are terms, usually written as x+ y, x+ y− z;
• = (+(x,y),0), ≦ (+(x,+(y,−(z))),+(x,y)) are atomic formulas, usually
written as x+ y = 0, x+ y− z≦ x+ y.
The relations, or predicates, = and ≦ are Boolean-valued if constants are inserted.
♦
Given a vocabulary Σ of constant symbols, functions, and relation, the uni-
versal quantifier ∀ (“for all”) and the existential quantifier ∃ (“there exists”) can
be introduced, acting on formulas P(. . . ,x, . . .) with a free variable x by writing
∀xP(x) or ∃xP(x), respectively. They have to satisfy the axioms
P1: (∀xP(x))→ P(t) for any term t without free variables.
P2: P(t)→ (∃xP(x)) for any term t without free variables.
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P3: (∀x(φ → P(x))) → (φ →∀xP(x)) for any atomic sentence φ .
P4: (∀x(P(x)→ φ)) → (∃xP(x)→ φ) for any atomic sentence φ .
In fact, the two quantifiers ∀ and ∃ are not independent. Since
∃= ¬∀¬, ∀= ¬∃¬, (124)
both quantifiers are dual to each another. Thus in fact, the introduction of only one
of them suffices to extend propositional logic to first-order logic.
A sentence of first-order logic is a formula having no free variables, i.e., only
quantified variables. For instance, ∃x ∀y x · y = x is a sentence of first order logic,
whereas ∃x x ·y = x is a formula but not a sentence, because y is a free variable. As
a primality formula for a natural number, we could define
pi(x) = ((1 < x) ∧ ∀u∀v ((x = u · v) → (u = 1∨ v = 1))) (125)
with the free variable x. The formula pi(x) is true if and only if x is a prime. This is
not a sentence. However, the assertion ∀z∃x (x > z∧pi(x)) that there are infinitely
many primes is a sentence.
Example 77. The vocabulary of ordered abelian groups has a constant 0, a unary
function −, a binary function +, and two binary relations = and ≦, so Σ = {0, −,
+, =, ≦}, and
• 0, x, y are atomic terms;
• +(x,y), +(x,+(y,−(z))) are terms, usually written as x+ y, x+ y− z;
• = (+(x,y),0), ≦ (+(x,+(y,−(z))),+(x,y)) are atomic formulas, usually
written as x+ y = 0, x+ y− z≦ x+ y.
• (∀x ∃y ≦ (+(x,y)),z) ∧ (∃x = (x,y) = 0)) is a formula, usually written as
(∀x ∃y x+ y ≦ z) ∧ ∃ y x+ y = 0).
♦
To summarize, first-order logic contains the nine fixed symbols
∧,∨,¬,→,↔,(,),∃,∀. (126)
Like propositional logic, first-order logic is complete [18, §V.4], [27, §4]. But
first-order logic is, in some sense, weak, although it is much richer than propo-
sitional logic. Whereas it can express “∃ n elements” for any finite n, it cannot
express “∃ countably many elements.” This is possible only with a “second-order
logic” which allows existential expressions about sets.
50 Andreas de Vries: Algebraic hierarchy of logics
8.2.1 Models
The truth of a Boolean expression φ in propositional logic is computed by a truth
assignment T being a mapping T : X ′ → {0,1} from a finite subset X ′ ⊆ X =
{x1,x2, . . .} of a countably infinite alphabet X of Boolean variables [35, §4.1]; then
T is said to satisfy the Boolean expression φ , in symbols T |= φ , if T (φ) = 1 [27,
§1.2].
However, in first-order logic variables, functions, and relations can take much
more complex values than just 0 and 1, or false and true. The analog of a truth
assignment for first-order logic is a far more complex mathematical object called a
“model.” Let Σ be a given vocabulary. A Σ-structure, or Σ-model, M is a pair (U |µ)
where U is a nonempty set U , the universe of M, and where µ is a function called
the interpretation of Σ assigning to each symbol in the vocabulary Σ a respective
object of the universe U :
• to each constant c ∈ Σ an element in U , i.e., µ(c) ∈U ;
• to each n-ary function f ∈ Σ a function g : Un →U , i.e., µ( f ) = g;
• to each n-ary relation R ∈ Σ a subset S⊂Un, i.e., µ(R) = S.
Suppose now M to be a Σ-structure and φ a sentence over Σ, then we define M to
model, or satisfy, φ , in symbols M |= φ , if the interpretation of the sentence φ as a
formula in M is true [27, §2.3]. Moreover, let ∆ be a set of sentences over Σ. Then
we write
∆ |= φ (127)
if any model which models all sentences in ∆, also models φ . For any Σ-structure
M, the theory of M is the set TM of all Σ-sentences φ such that M |= φ . A theory
T is decidable if there exists an algorithm which determines in a finite number of
steps whether or no a given Σ-sentence is in T .
Example 78. (Number systems) [27, §2.4.4] Consider the vocabulary of natural
numbers, Σ = {+, ·,1} having binary functions + and ·, written as usual in infix-
notation, e.g., “x+y” instead of “+(x,y),” and constants 0 and 1. We let 2 abbreviate
(1+1), x2 abbreviate x · x, 3 abbreviate 1+(1+1), and so on. Then we define the
Σ-model N as
• N = (N|+, ·,1)
Moreover, consider the vocabulary of arithmetic, Σ = {+, ·,0,1}, and the following
Σ-structures:
• A = (Z|+, ·,0,1)
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• Q = (Q|+, ·,0,1)
• R = (R|+, ·,0,1)
• C = (C|+, ·,0,1)
Each of these structures interpretes the symbols in Σ in the usual way. Then any
polynomial with natural numbers as coefficients is a Σ-term. Equations such as
x5 +9x+3 = 0
are Σ-formulas. (Note that 3 and x5 are not symbols in Σ, they are abbreviations for
the Σ-terms 1+(1+1) and x · (x · (x · (x · x))), respectively.)
Then the sentence φ = ∃x (x2 = 2) asserts the existence of √2. It follows
Q |= ¬φ and R |= φ , i.e., R models φ but Q does not. Likewise, the equation
2x + 3 = 0 has a solution in Q but not in A, so Q |= ∃x(2x + 3 = 0), whereas
A |= ¬∃x(2x+3 = 0).
To progress from N to Z to Q etc, we add solution for more and more poly-
nomials, reaching the end of the line with the complex numbers C. The sentence
∃x(x2 + 1 = 0) distinguishes C from all the other Σ-structures in the list. The
Fundamental Theorem of Algebra states that for any nonconstant polynomial p(x)
having coefficients in C, the equation p(x) = 0 has a solution in C. So there is no
need to extend to a bigger system, by virtue of adding a solution of x2+1 = 0 to R,
we added a solution to every polynomial. The names of the number systems, start-
ing from the “natural” numbers, extended by “negative” numbers to the integers,
further extended by even “irrational” numbers and at last by “imaginary” numbers
suggests that the systems get more and mor complicated as we progress from nat-
ural to complex numbers. From the point of view of first-order logic, however, this
is backwards. The structure C is the most simple [27, §5], whereas the structures
A, standing for arithmetic, and N are most complex [27, §8]. ♦
8.2.2 Proofs and axioms
Define Λ to be the set of logical axioms [35, §5.4]. Let φ be a first-order formula
and let ∆ be a set of first-order formulas. Moreover, let S = {φ1,φ2, . . . ,φn} be
a finite sequence of first-order formulas such that for each formula φi ∈ S, 1 ≦ i
≦ n, we have either (a) φi ∈ Λ, or (b) φi ∈ ∆, or (c) there are two expressions ψ ,
(ψ ⇒ φi) ∈ {φ1, . . . ,φi−1} ⊆ S. Then, S is called a (formal) proof of φ = φn from
∆, and we write
∆ ⊢ φ . (128)
Then φ is called a ∆-first-order theorem. Hence, a ∆-first-order theorem is an
ordinary first-order theorem if ∆ = /0 and we only have to satisfy the logical axioms
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Λ. In other words, a ∆-first-order theorem would be an ordinary first-order theorem
if we allowed all formulas in ∆ to be added to our logical axioms Λ. This is the
reason why the formulas in ∆ are often called nonlogical axioms.
Example 79. (Group theory) [35, Ex. 5.5] Let be Σ = {◦,1} and ∆ = {GT1, GT2,
GT3} where GT1, GT2, GT3 are the nonlogical axioms
GT1 = ∀x∀y∀z ((x◦ y)◦ z = x◦ (y◦ z)) (associativity of ◦),
GT2 = ∀x (x◦1 = x) (1 is the neutral element),
GT3 = ∀x∃y (x◦ y = 1) (existence of inverses).
(129)
These three simple axioms comprise a complete axiomatization of all groups. All
properties of groups can be deduced from these axioms by formal proofs. If we
want to axiomatize Abelian groups, we have to add another axiom
GT4 = ∀x∀y (x◦ y = y◦ x) (130)
On the other hand, if we want to study infinite groups, it suffices to add for each
n > 1 the sentence
φn = ∃x1∃x2 · · ·∃xn
∧
i6= j
(xi 6= x j). (131)
This infinite sequence of sentences is a complete axiomatization of infinite groups.
Thus group theory is axiomatizable, but is not decidable, unless we restrict to
Abelian groups. (Tarski showed in 1946 that any statement in Peano arithmetic can
be encoded as a statement in group theory, thus demonstrating that group theory
is universal, and that questions about it can be undecidable.) In contrast, Go¨del’s
incompleteness theorem is based on the fact that, if number theory were axiomati-
zable, then it would be decidable. ♦
Example 80. (Number theory) [27, §8.1] Let the vocabulary ΣN = {+, ·,1} be
given. The theory TN of the model N defined in Example 78 is then first-order
number theory. If TN had a decidable axiomatization, then in principle we could
use formal proof theory to answer every open number theoretic question. However,
by Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem, this is not the case. Since TN is unde-
cidable, it does not have a decidable first-order axiomatization [27, Prop. 5.10].
But there exists a second-order theory containing TN which does have a decidable
axiomatization. For this purpose, we define the set ∆ = {NT1, NT2, . . . , NT8} of
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the following (nonlogical) axioms:
NT1: ∀x ¬(x+1 = 1)
NT2: ∀x∀y (x+1 = y+1 → x = y)
NT3: ∀x∀y (x+ y = y+ x) (addit. commutativity)
NT4: ∀x∀y (x+(y+1) = (x+ y)+1) (addit. associativity)
NT5: ∀x (x ·1 = x) (multipl. neutral element),
NT6: ∀x∀y (x · y = y · x) (multipl. commutativity)
NT7: ∀x∀y (x · (y+1) = (x · y)+ x) (distributivity)
NT8: ∀1S(S(1)∧∀x(S(x)→ S(x+1))) → ∀xS(x) (induction)
The first seven axioms are all first-order, the Induction Axiom, however, is second-
order, since it quantifies over a relation: the expression “∀1S” is read “for all unary
relations S.” In effect, the Induction Axiom says that any subset of the universe N
which contains 1 and is closed under the function x+1 necessarily contains every
element in the universe. ♦
Theorem 81. (Soundness and Completeness) For any sentence φ and any set ∆ of
sentences, ∆ ⊢ φ if and only if ∆ |= φ .
Proof. [27, Thm. ], [35, Thm. 5.6, 5.7]
A proof system with the property ∆⊢ φ ⇒ ∆ |= φ in the above theorem is called
sound, i.e., the system only proves valid consequences. A system with the reverse
property ∆ |= φ ⇒ ∆ ⊢ φ is called complete and means that it is able to prove all
valid consequences. The fact that first-order logic is complete was first shown by
Go¨del in his Completeness Theorem (1930).
Let be ∆N be the set of first-order sentences from the axiomatization in Ex-
ample 80, with the Induction Axiom NT8 replaced by the set NT81 = {ψφ} of
ΣN-sentences ψφ which, for each ΣN-formula in one free variable, are defined by
ψφ = (φ(1)∧∀x(φ(x)→ φ(x+1))→∀xφ(x)). (132)
NT81 is thus a first-order “approximazation” of the Induction Axiom.
Theorem 82. (Go¨del’s First Incompleteness Theorem 1931) If T is a decidable
theory containing ∆N , then T is incomplete.
Proof. [27, §8.3].
54 Andreas de Vries: Algebraic hierarchy of logics
8.3 Modal logic
Another extension of propositional logic, besides first-order logic, is modal logic
[8, §27]. A modal logic is a logic for handling modalities, i.e., concepts like “possi-
bility” and “necessity.” Formally, a modal logic is a propositional logic established
with the modal operator ✷ of necessity, satisfying the following axioms.
N: (Necessitation rule) If A is true in propositional logic, then ✷A is also true.
K: (Distribution Axiom) If ✷(A→ B) then ✷A→✷B.
Usually, a further operator ✸ of possibility defined by the relation
✸A = ¬✷¬A, (133)
meaning that “it is not necessarily true that not-A is true,” or shortly “A is possibly
true.” In fact, the modal operators ✷ and ✸ are dual to one another,
✷= ¬✸¬, ✸= ¬✷¬. (134)
The two axioms N and K yield the weakest modal logic K, invented by Kripke,
there are stronger modal logics supposing more axioms.
T: (Reflexivity Axiom) ✷A → A.
4: (Non-contingent necessity) ✷A → ✷✷A.
B: (Symmetry) A → ✷✸A.
D: (Deontity) ✷A → ✸A.
Depending on the supposed axioms, these are defined the following modal logics:
• K : K+N.
• T : K+N+T.
• S4 : K+N+T+4.
• S5 : K+N+T+4+B.
• D : K+N+D.
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The historical roots of modal logic go back to Diodorus’ problem concerning
the question: “Will there be a sea battle tomorrow?” According to this question,
two propositions are possible answers, A = “There will be a sea battle tomorrow”
or ¬A = “There will not be a sea battle tomorrow.” In propositional logic, A is
neither true nor false, in modal logic we have ✸A =✸¬A = 1 (both A and ¬A are
possibly true), or by Eq. (134), ✷¬A =✷A = 0 (both A and ¬A are not necessarily
true).
In substructural logics there are also considered propositional structures with
even several modal negations, such as an “n-type negative pair” of operators or
“p-type negative pair” operators [38, §8.1].
9 Discussion
In this paper the relations of classical and non-classical concepts of logic are re-
viewed and unified algebraically. The systematic subjunction of algebraic restric-
tions to a lattice, viz., fuzzy negation, paraconsistency, non-contradiction, ortho-
modularity and distributivity, are shown to yield an algebraic hierarchy tree of
logics as in Figure 5. An essential step to this unifying picture is the notion of
a general fuzzy negation holding the conditions of weak double negation and an-
titony, as well as the Boolean boundary condition. Remarkably, the antitony is
equivalent to the disjunctive De Morgan law (Theorem 17), but does not guarantee
the conjunctive De Morgan law. Thus, in contrast to usual hitherto existing ap-
proaches to logic, the two De Morgan laws do not play a symmetric role. Example
21 shows the non-contradictory logic (M5,∼) in which the conjunctive De Morgan
law in fact does not hold.
With this notion of a fuzzy logic it is possible to prove the validity of the
conjunctive De Morgan law for a strong double negation satisfying x = x′′ for all
propositions x ∈ L (Theorem 22). If the logic is non-contradictory, a strong dou-
ble negation x = x′′ even implies the rule tertium non datur (Theorem 23), a result
which has been well-known for implicative logics (Theorem 69).
Thus, fuzzy logics naturally may be contradictory and non-orthomodular (Ex-
ample 39), whereas logics of quantum registers or composite spin-12 systems are
orthomodular, but typically non-distributive. On the other hand, implicative logics,
comprising intuitionistic and Boolean logics, are distributive, although there ex-
ist infinite distributive but non-implicative lattices. Notably, this concept of logic
rules out generalized approaches relaxing the lattice requirement on a logic to an
orthoalgebra [13, 21, 43] requirement, yielding “operational logics” or “quantum
temporal logics” [28, 34, 43]) of propositions about “consistent histories” [23]. In
fact, such structures should not be called “logics” since, technically, in non-lattice
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sets least upper or lower bounds need not exist such that the De Morgan laws are
not expressible, and philosophically, logical relations should be properly distin-
guished from causal relations [29, p. 39].
What are the benefits of the novel approach presented in this paper, besides a
possibly compelling unified view onto the zoo of logics? One open question in
the foundations of quantum theory is how quantum logics for composite quantum
systems are derived systematically. Taking into account non-orthomodular fuzzy
logics and perhaps some relaxations which render them into effect algebras [4, 19,
20, 39] might point a new way to this outstanding problem.
References
[1] D. Aerts. ‘Description of many physical entities without the paradoxes en-
countered in quantum mechanics’. Foundations of Physics, 12:1131–1170,
1982.
http://www.vub.ac.be/CLEA/aerts/publications/1982SepEntParQuant.pdf.
[2] D. Aerts and B. van Steirteghem. ‘Quantum axiomatics and a theorem of
M.P. Sole`r’. Int. J. Theor. Phys., 39:497–502, 2000. quant-ph/0105107.
[3] A. Aspect, P. Grangier, and G. Roger. ‘Experimental realiza-
tion of Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedankenexperiment: a new vi-
olation of Bell’s inequalities’. Phys. Rev. Lett, 49:91–94, 1982.
http://link.aps.org/abstract/PRL/ v49/p91.
[4] M. K. Bennett and D. J. Foulis. ‘Interval and scale effect algebras’. Adv. in
Appl. Math., 19(2):200–215, 1997. doi:10.1006/aama.1997.0535.
[5] G. Birkhoff. Lattice Theory. American Mathematical Society, Providence,
3rd edition, 1973.
[6] G. Birkhoff and J. von Neumann. ‘The logic of quantum mechanics’. Annals
of Mathematics, 37(4):823–843, 1936.
[7] H. Boley. ‘The Rule Markup Language: RDF-XML Data Model,
XML Schema Hierarchy, and XSL Transformations’. In Web Knowl-
edge Management and Decision Support: 14th International Confer-
ence on Applications of Prolog, INAP 2001, Tokyo, Japan, October
20-22, 2001. Revised Papers, volume 2543 of Lecture Notes in Com-
puter Science, pages 5–22, Berlin Heidelberg, 2003. Springer-Verlag.
http://www.informatik.uni-trier.de/˜ley/db/conf/inap/inap2001.html#Boley01.
Andreas de Vries: Algebraic hierarchy of logics 57
[8] G. S. Boolos, J. P. Burgess, and R. C. Jeffrey. Computability and Logic.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
[9] B. Buldt. ‘Supervaluvagefuzzysoritalhistorisch’. In R. Seising, editor, Fu-
zzy Theorie und Stochastik, pages 41–85, Braunschweig Wiesbaden, 1999.
Vieweg.
[10] D. W. Cohen. An Introduction to Hilbert Space and Quantum Logic.
Springer-Verlag, New York Berlin Heidelberg, 1989.
[11] H. B. Curry. ‘The inconsistency of certain formal logics’. Journal of Symbolic
Logic, 7:115–117, 1942.
[12] H. B. Curry. Foundations of Mathematical Logic. Dover Publications, New
York, 1977.
[13] M. L. Dalla Chiara. ‘Unsharp quantum logics’. Int. J. Theor. Phys.,
34(8):1331–1336, 1995. doi:10.1007/BF00676245.
[14] M. L. Dalla Chiara and R. Giuntini. ‘Quantum Logics’. In D. Gabbay
and F. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical Logic, pages 129–228,
Dordrecht, 2002. Kluwer.
[15] M. L. Dalla Chiara, R. Giuntini, and R. Greechie. Reasoning in Quantum
Theory. Sharp and Unsharp Quantum Logics. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht Boston London, 2004.
[16] G. Deschrijver and E. E. Kerre. ‘Triangular norms and related operators in
L∗-fuzzy set theory’. In E. P. Klement and R. Mesiar, editors, Logical, Alge-
braic, Analytic, and Probabilistic Aspects of Triangular Norms, pages 231–
259, Amsterdam, 2005. Elsevier.
[17] A. Dvurecˇenskij and S. Pulmannova´. New Trends in Quantum Structures.
Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 2000.
[18] H.-D. Ebbinghaus, J. Flum, and W. Thomas. Einfu¨hrung in die mathemati-
sche Logik. Spektrum Akademischer Verlag, Heidelberg Berlin, 1996.
[19] D. J. Foulis. ‘The universal group of a Heyting effect algebra’. Studia Logica,
84(3):407–424, 2006. doi:10.1007/s11225-006-9015-8.
[20] D. J. Foulis and M. K. Bennett. ‘Effect algebras and unsharp quantum logics’.
Foundations of Physics, 24(10):1331–1352, 1994. doi:10.1007/BF02283036.
58 Andreas de Vries: Algebraic hierarchy of logics
[21] D. J. Foulis, R. J. Greechie, and G. T. Ru¨ttimann. ‘Filters and sup-
ports on orthoalgebras’. Int. J. Theor. Phys., pages 789–807, 1992.
doi:10.1007/ BF00678545.
[22] D. J. Foulis and C. H. Randall. ‘Empirical Logic and Tensor Products’. In
H. Neumann, editor, Interpretations and Foundations of Quantum Mechanics,
pages 9–20, Mannheim, 1981. BI Wissenschaftsverlag.
[23] M. Gell-Mann and J. B. Hartle. ‘Quantum mechanics in the light of quantum
cosmology’. In W. H. Zurek, editor, Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of
Information, pages 425–458, Reading, 1990. Addison-Wesley.
[24] A. Goswami. Quantum Mechanics. Wm. C. Brown publishers, Dubuque, IA,
2nd edition, 1997.
[25] S. Gottwald and P. Ha´jek. ‘Triangular norm-based mathematical fuzzy log-
ics’. In E. P. Klement and R. Mesiar, editors, Logical, Algebraic, Analytic,
and Probabilistic Aspects of Triangular Norms, pages 275–299, Amsterdam,
2005. Elsevier.
[26] P. Ha´jek. Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic. Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht Boston London, 1998.
[27] S. Hedman. A First Course in Logic. An Introduction to Model Theory, Proof
Theory, Computability, and Complexity. Oxford University Press, Oxford
New York, 2004.
[28] C. J. Isham and N. Linden. ‘Quantum temporal logic and decoherence func-
tionals in the histories approach to generalised quantum theory’. J. Math.
Phys., 35(10):5452–5476, 1994. doi:10.1063/1.53075.
[29] E. Joos, H. D. Zeh, C. Kiefer, D. Giulini, J. Kupsch, and I.-O. Stamatescu.
Decoherence and the Appearance of a Classical World in Quantum Theory.
Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2nd edition, 2003.
[30] E. P. Klement, R. Mesiar, and E. Pap. ‘Bausteine der Fuzzy Logic: t-Normen
– Eigenschaften und Darstellungssa¨tze’. In R. Seising, editor, Fuzzy Theorie
und Stochastik, pages 205–225, Braunschweig Wiesbaden, 1999. Vieweg.
[31] G. W. Mackey. Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. W. A.
Benjamin, New York, 1963.
[32] P. Mittelstaedt. Quantum Logic. D. Reidel Publ. Co, Dordrecht, 1978.
Andreas de Vries: Algebraic hierarchy of logics 59
[33] M. A. Nielsen and I. L. Chuang. Quantum Computation and Quantum Infor-
mation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000.
[34] R. Omne`s. ‘A new interpretation of quantum mechanics and its consequences
in epistemology’. Found. Phys., 25:605, 1995.
[35] C. M. Papadimitriou. Computational Complexity. Addison-Wesley, Reading,
Massachusetts, 1994.
[36] P. Pta´k and H. Weber. ‘Lattice properties of subspace families in an
inner product space’. Proc. Amer. Math. Soc., 129:2111–2117, 2001.
http://www.ams.org/proc/2001-129-07/S0002-9939-01-05855-5/.
[37] C. H. Randall and D. J. Foulis. ‘Properties and operational propositions in
quantum mechanics’. Foundations of Physics, 13:843–857, 1983.
[38] G. Restall. An Introduction to Substructural Logics. Routledge, London New
York, 2000.
[39] F. E. Schroeck Jr. ‘Algebra of effects in the formalism of quantum mechanics
on Ppase space as an M. V. and a Heyting effect algebra’. Int. J. Theor. Phys.,
44(11):789–807, 2005. doi:10.1007/s10773-005-0343-7.
[40] M. P. Sole`r. ‘Characterization of Hilbert spaces by orthomodular spaces’.
Comm. Algebra, 23(1):219–243, 1995. MR1311786 (95k:46035).
[41] K. Svozil. Quantum Logic. Springer-Verlag, Singapore, 1998.
[42] V. S. Varadarajan. The Geometry of Quantum Mechanics. Springer-Verlag,
New York Heidelberg Berlin, 1985.
[43] A. Wilce. ‘Compact orthoalgebras’. Proc. Amer. Math. Soc., 133:2911–2920,
2005. http://www.ams.org/proc/2005-133-10/S0002-9939-05-07884-6/.
[44] A. Wilce. Quantum logic and probability theory. In E. N.
Zalta, editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2006.
http://plato.stanford.edu/ archives/spr2006/entries/qt-quantlog/.
[45] L. A. Zadeh. ‘Fuzzy sets’. Information and Control, 8:338–353, 1965.






